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CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
ANDREW MCCANSE WRIGHT* 
In matters of oversight, Congress and the President have 
fundamentally incompatible views of their institutional roles within the 
constitutional structure.  This Article offers an explanation of divergent 
branch behavior and legal doctrine.  Congress, much like a party to 
litigation, views itself as having fixed substantive rights to obtain desired 
information from the Executive and private parties.  In contrast, the 
Executive views itself like a party to a business transaction, in which 
congressional oversight requests are the opening salvo in an iterative 
negotiation process to resolve competing interests between co-equal 
branches.  In general, legislators want to litigate and executive officers 
want to negotiate. 
Among the formal and informal remedies to enforce its oversight 
prerogatives, Congress prefers contempt.  However, contempt is 
problematic when the resisting party is an executive branch official 
following executive branch policy.  Because the constitutional scheme 
places a premium on good-faith negotiation between Congress and the 
Executive, congressional self-help is generally more appropriate than 
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litigation for interbranch oversight disputes.  While abstention and 
restraint should be the hallmark of Article III courts presented with 
bickering political branches, there is an important role for the judiciary.  
As such, this Article offers principles that guide courts to facilitate, or 
approximate, accommodation and compromise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Practical, day-to-day congressional oversight disputes1 betray a deep 
canyon between Congress and the President that cuts to the very 
 
1.  Oversight disputes play out in a variety of circumstances, such as exchanging letters 
prompted by a congressional committee request for documents, requesting staff- or member-
level briefings, debating the scheduling and scope of hearings or briefings, haggling over the 
availability and appropriateness of hearing witnesses, and negotiating security protocols for 
sensitive documents.  See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, & Elijah Cummings, 
Ranking Member, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Mark J. Sullivan, Dir., 
U.S. Secret Serv. (Apr. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Comm. Letter to Dir. Sullivan].  Congressional 
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foundations of our constitutional structure.  The Legislative and 
Executive Branches live with wholly different, and largely incompatible, 
perspectives of the constitutional scheme. 
The respective behaviors of Congress and the Executive on matters 
of congressional oversight can be best explained through the analogies 
of litigation and transactions.  Congress largely adopts the model of 
litigation and, at times, criminal investigations.2  The Executive, in 
contrast, adopts a model of negotiated transactions.3  Each branch 
believes its model is firmly grounded in its role within the constitutional 
scheme.  There are also perfectly rational, self-interested reasons the 
political branches choose to adopt these different perspectives. 
Legislators view the congressional oversight function as a 
constitutional mandate to use litigation-like tools for a variety of 
oversight goals, mostly focused on the conduct of the Executive.4  In the 
eyes of Congress, there are congressional rules that must be followed, 
document requests that should be answered, subpoenas that must be 
satisfied, and witnesses that must appear.  As such, executive targets of 
congressional oversight requests face the binary status of compliance or 
noncompliance.  To Congress, noncompliance by executive officials 
eventually amounts to the crime of contempt.  
This perspective ultimately explains the views of House Counsel and 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)5 that Congress has 
a presumptive right to obtain any information subject only to the 
narrowest of exceptions, and then only when contained in a valid, 
formal assertion of executive privilege.  Additionally, the litigation 
model contemplates a role for Article III courts as a routine instrument 
of congressional subpoena enforcement.   
 
committee chairs can escalate by issuing subpoenas or making phone calls to senior 
administration officials.  See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 122 
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (“In the course of the investigation, the Subcommittee issued a subpoena for 
certain documents in the hands of the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. . . . .”).  
Eventually, the President might assert executive privilege in the face of a congressional move 
to hold an executive branch official in contempt.  See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege in 
Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 27–28 (1981).  All of these disputes have the 
feel of tug-of-war over practical line drawing about the quantity and nature of information to 
be provided to Congress. 
2.  See infra Part III.A.  For purposes of economy, references to the “litigation model” 
will include the concepts of civil litigation and criminal investigations. 
3.  See infra Part III.B. 
4.  Some congressional oversight efforts are targeted at other actors, including the 
judiciary, state or local governments, international organizations, and private entities. 
5.  GAO is a congressional, Article I entity and not a part of the Executive. 
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In contrast, the Executive envisions itself as a party to an arm’s 
length business transaction in which both parties negotiate appropriate 
price and terms based on their respective bargaining power.  As such, 
the Executive’s transactional model lends itself to the principles 
articulated by the Office of Legal Counsel across administrations of 
different political parties: Congress has legitimate information interests, 
but those interests must be balanced against important executive branch 
interests in confidentiality.  The Executive is also the beneficiary of 
inaction.  Therefore, the Executive resists a judicial enforcement role, 
preferring that outcomes be primarily defined by the relative leverage 
allotted to each political branch in a given situation. 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder6 is a 
paradigmatic example of the chasm between Congress and the 
Executive, and it could prompt the most significant judicial decision in 
an interbranch dispute since Watergate.  Holder arises out of a 
document dispute related to a congressional investigation of “Operation 
Fast and Furious.”7  Fast and Furious was a multi-agency investigation 
led by the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
(ATF).8  The core allegation prompting congressional inquiry is that 
ATF investigative practices allowed assault weapons that should have 
been seized or otherwise controlled into the stream of commerce.9  
Further, there is evidence that a number of weapons at issue have been 
used in violent crimes on both sides of the U.S.–Mexico border, 
including the murder of a U.S. Customs and Border Patrol Agent 
named Brian Terry.10 
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA), in his capacity as Chairman of 
the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, led the 
congressional investigation into Fast and Furious.11  Notwithstanding 
 
6.  979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).  
7.  Hereafter, I refer to the operation as “Fast and Furious.”  
8.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3. 
9.  Id. 
10.  Id. at 5. 
11.  Hereafter, I refer to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the 
U.S. House of Representatives as the “Oversight Committee.”  While all committees in the 
House have oversight authority related to matters within their jurisdiction, the Oversight 
Committee has a much broader investigative mandate that includes “the operation of 
Government activities at all levels.”  COMM. ON RULES, 111TH CONG., RULES ADOPTED BY 
THE COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 394 (Comm. Print 2009) 
[hereinafter HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED] (Rule X, cl. 3(i)).  The U.S. 
Senate committee with the closest approximation of the Oversight Committee’s mandate is 
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evidence of problematic ATF tactics, the congressional investigation 
quickly took on a partisan tone.12  Congressional investigators took 
dozens of transcribed interviews, reviewed thousands of pages of 
executive branch documents, and obtained other information through in 
camera access agreements with the Executive.  The remaining 
information sought by the House largely consists of information about 
how the Executive responded to congressional inquiry rather than the 
underlying ATF activities.13  Eventually, the House threatened to hold 
Attorney General Holder in contempt of Congress if he did not produce 
the subpoenaed material.14  That threat provoked President Obama to 
assert executive privilege.15  Thereafter, the House cited the Attorney 
General for contempt and filed suit to enforce its subpoena.16  For those 
following the investigation, it has stoked partisan passion and criticism 
across the political spectrum.17 
That said, the subject matter of congressional–executive disputes 
often possesses a partisan character.18  In fact, as many scholars have 
noted, disputes between Congress and the President over documents 
and witnesses tend to be more frequent and more pronounced during 
periods of divided government.19  After the Republicans won the House 
 
the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, although it has primary 
jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security in addition to its broader oversight 
authority.  COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., 112TH CONG., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING 
THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, at 98 (2011) [hereinafter SENATE COMM. 
ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL].  In the House, that function was assigned to the Committee 
on Homeland Security rather than the Oversight Committee.  HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 
RULES ADOPTED, supra, at 393 (Rule X, cl. 3(g)(1)). 
12.  See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, to President Barack Obama 5 (June 25, 2012) [hereinafter Comm. Letter to 
President Obama] (outlining the inconsistent responses the Oversight Committee received 
from the White House). 
13.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6. 
14.  Id. at 6. 
15.  Id. 
16.  Id. at 7. 
17.  See, e.g., Johnathan Weisman & Charlie Savage, House Cites Holder for Contempt 
in Gun Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A3; see also Sari Horwitz, A Gunrunning Sting 
Gone Fatally Wrong, WASH. POST, July 26, 2011, at A1. 
18.  See William P. Marshall, The Limits on Congress’s Authority to Investigate the 
President, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 781, 782 (“Congressional investigations . . . provide a 
President’s opponents with a considerable opportunity to engage in political mischief.”). 
19.  There is conclusive, and unsurprising, evidence in the political science literature that 
the intensity of congressional oversight of the Executive spikes during periods of divided 
government.  See Douglas L. Kriner & Eric Schickler, Investigating the President: Committee 
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in the 2010 midterm elections, the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform developed strongly partisan themes towards the 
Obama administration, alleging and investigating political interference,20 
financial mismanagement,21 policy failure,22 security incompetence,23 
 
Probes and Presidential Approval, 1953–2006, 76 J. POL. 521, 521 (2014) (“Marshaling an 
original data set of more than 3,500 investigative hearings and over 50 years of public opinion 
data, we show that increased investigative activity in the hearing room significantly decreases 
the president’s job approval rating.”); David C.W. Parker & Matthew Dull, Divided We 
Quarrel: The Politics of Congressional Investigations, 1947–2004, 34 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 319, 
321–22 (2009) (finding “congressional investigations activity increases during periods of 
divided government” and noting that “[d]ivided government is clearly related to an increase 
in the number and intensity of congressional investigations in the House of Representatives, 
but evidence of this relationship is much weaker in the Senate”); see also DAVID R. 
MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 
1946–2002, at 3 (2d ed. 2005) (noting the theory that “Congress acting as an investigative body 
will give more trouble to the executive branch when a president of the opposite party holds 
power”); Douglas Kriner & Liam Schwartz, Divided Government and Congressional 
Investigations, 33 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 295, 298 (2008) (“[T]he willingness of Congress to exercise 
its oversight powers to constrain the executive is conditional on whether or not investigations 
serve the electoral interests of the majority party.”); Robert J. McGrath, Congressional 
Oversight Hearings and Policy Control, 38 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 349, 362 (2013) (concluding that 
“there are significantly more oversight hearing days for committees controlled by the 
presidential out-party than for those controlled by the party of the president”).  But see 
MAYHEW, supra, at 3 (arguing that congressional oversight activity does not materially 
increase in intensity during periods of divided government).  To be sure, Congress still 
exercises its oversight function when one party controls both a congressional chamber and the 
White House, but it tends to take on a different character. 
20.  See Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, & Jim Jordan, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus 
Oversight & Gov’t Spending, to Lois G. Lerner, Dir., Exempt Orgs. Div., IRS (Mar. 27, 2012) 
(requesting documents related to IRS questionnaires allegedly targeting conservative political 
organizations for review of their tax exempt status). 
21.  For example, in April 2012, Chairman Issa sent letters to twenty-three executive 
branch departments and agencies seeking information on the costs of conferences sponsored 
by the federal government that mushroomed into a spending scandal focused primarily on the 
General Services Administration.  See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Attorney Gen. Eric Holder, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
(Apr. 10, 2012) (a representative document request letter in the Oversight Committee’s 
conference spending investigation that characterizes such conference expenditures as 
“frivolous”). 
22.  STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., THE 
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY’S DISASTROUS MANAGEMENT OF LOAN GUARANTEE 
PROGRAMS 2 (Comm. Print 2012) (asserting that taxpayer losses related to the bankruptcy of 
Solyndra, which had government-backed loans, were the result of mismanagement by 
political appointees at the Department of Energy and represented “just the beginning” of 
such losses in the relevant loan program). 
23.  See STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG., 
BENGHAZI ATTACKS: INVESTIGATIVE UPDATE—INTERIM REPORT ON THE 
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sexual misconduct,24 criminal conduct,25 and obstruction of congressional 
inquiry.26  Other committees have also pursued such investigations 
within their spheres of jurisdiction.27  While less frequent and intense, 
the Democrat-controlled Senate also engaged in significant oversight 
activity of the Obama Administration.28  However, the intensity of 
divided government oversight will likely resume in light of the 
Republican takeover of the Senate in 2015. 
Likewise, when the Democrats controlled the House and President 
George W. Bush occupied the White House, Representative Henry 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD 9 (Comm. Print 2013) (criticizing the Obama 
Administration for the “unnecessary loss of American life” in Benghazi, Libya). 
24.  See Comm. Letter to Dir. Sullivan, supra note 1 (seeking documents and 
information related to solicitation of prostitutes by U.S. Secret Service agents and military 
personnel in Colombia in advance of a presidential trip).  Ranking Member Cummings joined 
this request in a rare show of bipartisanship on the Oversight Committee during Chairman 
Issa’s tenure. 
25.  See Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, to Kathryn Ruemmler, Counsel to the President (July 11, 2011) (alleging “blatant 
and potentially illegal use of the White House and other official government resources for 
fundraising purposes” in connection with a Democratic National Committee event in the 
Blue Room of the White House). 
26.  See, e.g., Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 2 (alleging the 
Oversight Committee had “been stonewalled for months by the Attorney General and his 
senior staff” in the Fast and Furious investigation); Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, to Sec’y Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., at 1 (Dec. 11, 2013) (noting that, in connection with the investigation 
of problems with the healthcare.gov website, “[t]he Department’s most recent effort to 
stonewall . . . has morphed from mere obstinacy into criminal obstruction of a congressional 
investigation”); Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, & Jim Jordan, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Econ. Growth, Job Creation & 
Regulatory Affairs, to Attorney Gen. Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, at 1 (Jan. 8, 
2014) (asserting that “the FBI’s blatant lack of cooperation with the Committee may rise to 
the level of criminal obstruction of a congressional investigation” into alleged IRS targeting 
of conservative organizations). 
27.  See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 
112TH CONG., THE SOLYNDRA FAILURE (Comm. Print 2012) (outlining Republican staff 
perspectives on U.S.-backed energy loans to Solyndra and other green technology 
companies); Memorandum from the Majority Staff to the Republican Members of the Energy 
& Commerce Comm. (May 31, 2012) (presenting Republican members of the committee with 
allegations of congressional exclusion from Obama Administration negotiations with private 
health care industry stakeholders); Memorandum from the Majority Staff to Republican 
Members of the Energy & Commerce Comm. (June 8, 2012) (elaborating further on the 
status of the investigation). 
28.  See, e.g., U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REVIEW OF THE 
TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11–12, 2012, 
S. REP. NO. 113-134 (2014) (criticizing the Executive for failing to prevent the Benghazi 
attacks). 
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Waxman (D-CA) used his chairmanship of the Oversight Committee to 
investigate a wide variety of issues that took on a partisan tone.29  In 
fact, it was during that era, albeit involving a different committee, that 
the district court decided Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers,30 
foreshadowing the early rulings in Holder. 
Such situational partisan disputes play out against the backdrop of 
remarkably stable, but conflicting, institutional perspectives of Capitol 
Hill and the White House.  Most of the time, congressional oversight 
operates under the radar.  Often it involves informal, staff-to-staff 
communication between agencies and their committees of jurisdiction.  
As repeat players on budget negotiations and authorizations, the staffs 
of the committees and the agencies within their jurisdiction have strong 
incentives to resolve information disputes informally.  In other 
instances, institutional conflict is real, but Congress lacks political will to 
escalate, or the issues involved have not caught the public imagination 
beyond the small Washington news outlets that effectively serve as trade 
publications for political professionals.  They are more brush fire than 
blaze.  However, as with Miers and Holder, congressional oversight 
disputes can rapidly reach full-blown constitutional conflagration. 
This Article argues that the constitutional scheme places a premium 
on good faith negotiation between Congress and the Executive 
backstopped by rare instances of judicial resolution.  Both branches’ 
models have functional advantages but also claim too much in that the 
Executive categorically rejects justiciability while Congress rejects the 
 
29.  See HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 110TH CONG., ACTIVITIES 
OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, H.R. REP. NO. 110-930, 
at 1 (2008) (chronicling over 200 oversight hearings and identifying major investigations 
examining “waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq reconstruction and other government contracting; 
the activities of Blackwater and other private security contractors; the politicization of science 
in federal agencies; White House mismanagement of federal records; . . . formaldehyde levels 
in FEMA trailers; the treatment of wounded returning soldiers at Walter Reed Army Medical 
Center; and misleading veterans’ charities” as well as “[o]ther investigations examin[ing] the 
disclosure of CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson’s identity . . . [and] the fratricide of Army 
Ranger Patrick Tillman”). 
30.  558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008).  The dispute in Miers related to the House 
Committee on the Judiciary (Judiciary Committee) investigation of the abrupt termination of 
nine presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorneys.  Id. at 57–58.  In the course 
of the investigation, the Judiciary Committee sought documents from the White House and 
testimony from senior White House aides.  Id. at 58.  Pursuant to an assertion of executive 
privilege by President George W. Bush, former White House Counsel Harriet Miers resisted 
a subpoena commanding her appearance as a witness at a congressional hearing.  Id. at 62.  
Under the same assertion of executive privilege, White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten 
resisted production of documents or a log of withheld documents.  Id. 
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merits of executive privilege.  A litigation model mitigates unchecked 
executive power, especially when there is the specter of judicial 
enforcement of oversight requests where congressional self-help fails.  A 
transactional model recognizes legitimate competing institutional 
interests, especially when there is no meaningful due process or other 
procedural constraint on politically motivated, non-germane, and 
unduly burdensome requests.   
In cases of impasse, Congress primarily enforces its requests through 
political self-help remedies rather than outsourcing enforcement to the 
courts.  When Congress does seek judicial enforcement, restraint is 
generally the hallmark of Article III tribunals presented with bickering 
political branches.31  However, in order to preserve the constitutional 
scheme and provide a deterrent to executive intransigence, the judiciary 
reserves the power to intervene in the event of a constitutional crisis.32  
As discussed below, the initial two rulings in Holder—one finding the 
matter justiciable and the other requiring the production of an executive 
privilege log—signal the court’s sensitivity to the delicate separation-of-
powers issues at stake.33 
In order to bring these arguments to the fore, the Article addresses 
the oversight function, the respective branch views, potential remedies 
for oversight frustration, and the role of the judiciary.  Part II outlines 
the constitutional basis for the oversight function.  It also addresses the 
scope and some limitations of that function.  Part III sets forth the 
fundamentally different, and inconsistent, constitutional visions held by 
Congress and the Executive.  Part IV analyzes the various remedies 
Congress has used to enforce its oversight prerogatives.  It also describes 
the problematic issue of judicial involvement in congressional–executive 
disputes.  Part V examines the Holder litigation as an illustration of the 
political branches’ competing views and of the thorny issues the 
litigation presents to the court called in to resolve the dispute. 
This Article begins a body of work designed to construct conceptual 
frameworks that explain congressional oversight confrontations.  Legal 
academic research on congressional oversight tends to focus on formal 
 
31.  See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (M.D. 
Fla. 1977) (“Disputes and confrontations between those branches always present the kinds of 
stress and tension that threaten to separate and divide those lines into chasms, ultimately 
collapsing our constitutionally created form of government.  Hence, to avert and minimize 
such tensions is always the proper and prudent course of action.”).  
32.  See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–04 (1974). 
33.  See infra Part V.B. 
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processes rather than the divergent constitutional perspectives that drive 
interbranch conflict.34  This Article offers an explanation of divergent 
branch behavior and legal doctrine.  In sum, this Article envisions a 
unified theory of congressional oversight that recognizes enduring 
conflict, tension, and disagreement between the political branches. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS AND SCOPE  
OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 
A. A Preliminary Note on Constitutional  
Analysis of Separation of Powers 
One of the challenges associated with analyzing the constitutional 
authority for the congressional oversight function is that all three 
branches of the federal government have their own perspective on the 
question.  Legal scholars traditionally look to the Supreme Court for 
definitive pronouncements about the scope and meaning of 
constitutional issues.  However, with respect to the delineation of 
powers in the separation of powers scheme, the views and historical 
practices of a branch as to its own power vis-à-vis coordinate branches 
have independent constitutional significance.35 
In United States v. Nixon,36 the Supreme Court offered a classic 
formulation of separation of powers: “In designing the structure of our 
Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign power among 
three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to 
provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not 
intended to operate with absolute independence.”37  Separation of 
powers is the structural division of state sovereignty into three 
 
34.  As will be discussed, the weight of legal research on congressional oversight focuses 
on congressional subpoenas, assertions of executive privilege, and academic lamentation of 
ineffective oversight efforts.  Political science research also addresses these topics, and it 
provides further insight into the frequency of oversight activity, especially as a function of 
divided government.  See infra note 105 and accompanying text.  This Article contributes 
context to the informal oversight motivations, interactions, and perspectives that create the 
context in which formal interbranch conflict occurs. 
35.  See generally Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government 
of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 
471–84 (1987) (arguing that each branch has a separate legal doctrine of executive privilege). 
36.  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
37.  Id. at 707. 
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functional institutions.38  These branches are characterized by co-
equality, and the separation between them relates to functions of 
governance.  The Nixon court also recognized that the powers are not 
self-contained and hermetically sealed.39  Instead, at the edges, powers 
may bleed and powers may blend.  Thus, Justice Jackson observed in 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer40 that there exists a “zone of 
twilight in which [the President] and Congress may have concurrent 
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”41  Such 
indeterminacy may also exist with respect to executive–judicial or 
congressional–judicial allocations. 
This structure has consequences for constitutional analyses that are 
unique to the separation of powers context.  In Nixon, the Supreme 
Court recognized the legitimacy of its sister branches in constitutional 
analysis: 
In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch 
of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and 
the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great 
respect from the others. . . .  Many decisions of this Court, 
however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury 
v. Madison, that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”42 
As such, the Nixon formulation recognizes that each branch has a 
role in constitutional interpretation, in which the Supreme Court is first 
among equals rather than the exclusive arbiter of power allocation.43  
However, as “first” branch, the Constitution reserves to the Supreme 
Court the final word in matters of formal constitutional interpretation.44 
These structural considerations have implications for purposes of 
this Article.  First, the structure enhances the constitutional significance 
of non-judicial-branch views on allocation of power.  Second, because 
oversight interactions between Congress and the Executive almost 
universally occur without any judicial involvement, as a functional 
 
38.  State sovereignty is further divided by those powers reserved to the states as a 
matter of federalism and those rights granted to citizens as the Constitution was amended.   
39.  See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.  
40.  343 U.S. 579 (1952).  
41.  Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
42.  Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. at 703–04. 
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matter, the likelihood of judicial involvement is remote.  Third, as 
discussed more fully below, judicial review of inter branch oversight 
disputes is problematic because, under certain circumstances, review 
itself could disturb allocation of power between Congress and the 
Executive in unhealthy ways. 
B. The Constitutional Basis of Congressional Oversight 
A threshold question arises as to the basis of congressional authority 
to conduct oversight.  While the Constitution invests Congress with 
“[a]ll legislative Powers,”45 it is silent as to inquiry power.  The Supreme 
Court recognizes “there is no provision expressly investing either house 
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it 
may exercise its legislative function advisedly and effectively.”46  Rather, 
the power is incidental to the legislative power itself and supported by 
the historical practice of English and American legislative institutions.47  
It is firmly settled that the congressional oversight function is grounded 
in the legislative powers granted to Congress in Article I.48  On this 
point, all three branches of government are in basic agreement. 
1. Congress 
Congress itself routinely cites the constitutional imprimatur of its 
oversight function.  According to a congressional oversight manual 
published by a component of the Library of Congress, “The 
Constitution grants Congress extensive authority to oversee and 
investigate executive branch activities.”49  During the 111th Congress, 
the Republican staff of the House Oversight Committee issued a report 
 
45.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
46.  McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927). 
47.  Id. 
48.  Id. 
49.  FREDERICK M. KAISER, WALTER J. OLESZEK & TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL 4 (2011), available at http://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30240.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZB8-LZ7C; see also ALISSA 
M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1920–2012: HISTORY, LAW, AND PRACTICE 3 (2012) 
(“While there is no express provision of the Constitution or specific statute authorizing the 
conduct of congressional oversight or investigations, the Supreme Court has firmly 
established that such power is essential to the legislative function as to be implied from the 
general vesting of legislative powers in Congress.”). 
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entitled, “A Constitutional Obligation: Congressional Oversight of the 
Executive Branch.”50 
There are also a number of scholarly sources upon which Congress 
relies to assert the constitutional basis of its oversight power.  For 
example, Congress regularly quotes Woodrow Wilson: “Quite as 
important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration.”51  
Further, congressional sources credit Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. for his 
introductory comments to the multi-volume work, Congress Investigates, 
that  
no provision of the American Constitution gave Congress 
express authority to conduct investigations and compel 
testimony.  But it was not considered necessary to make an 
explicit grant of such authority.  The power to make laws implied 
the power to see whether they were faithfully executed.  The 
right to secure needed information had long been deemed by 
both the British Parliament and the colonial assemblies as a 
necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to legislate.52 
Congress will also, of course, rely on the Supreme Court’s 
recognition of the implied constitutional basis of its oversight 
authority.53  In addition, Congress codified its oversight responsibility 
for “continuous watchfulness” over executive agencies in the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946.54 
2. The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]here can be no doubt as to 
the power of Congress, by itself or through its committees, to investigate 
 
50.  STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 111TH CONG., A 
CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF THE EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION]. 
51.  WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN 
POLITICS 297 (1885).  For examples of congressional reliance on this quotation, see, for 
example, A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION, supra note 50, at 3; JOINT COMM. ON THE 
ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS, FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE 
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, vol. II, S. REP. NO. 103-215, vol. II, 
at 150 (1993) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 4. 
52.  1 CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 1792–1974, at xix (Arthur 
M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Bruns eds., 1975).  For examples of congressional citation to this 
work, see, for example, A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION, supra note 50, at 3; FINAL 
REPORT, supra note 51, at 151. 
53.  KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 5. 
54.  Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 136, 60 Stat. 812, 832. 
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matters and conditions related to contemplated legislation.”55  Early in 
the Republic, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s power to hold 
citizens in contempt in Anderson v. Dunn.56  There, the Court dismissed 
a trespass action by a plaintiff, who had been held in contempt for 
attempting to bribe a member of Congress, on the basis that 
congressional contempt power was valid.57  A lower federal court next 
addressed contempt ten years after the Civil War in Stewart v. Blaine,58 
where the contempt finding was grounded in a refusal to cooperate with 
a congressional inquiry.  The court did not specifically address 
congressional power to conduct the inquiry but rather relied on 
Anderson, applying stare decisis principles as a basis to dismiss a tort 
action.59  Over the next several decades, parties litigated contempt in 
both oversight and non-oversight contexts, but none of them specifically 
addressed congressional power to investigate.60 
The Supreme Court finally articulated the constitutional basis for 
congressional oversight in McGrain v. Daugherty,61 nearly 150 years 
after the Founding.  There, the Court was squarely presented with the 
question of whether “power to make investigations and exact testimony 
. . . is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied.”62  The 
Court noted that legislative practice after and predating the American 
Revolution had involved a power to secure needed information.63  It 
surveyed a number of state court opinions that recognized the power of 
legislative inquiry.64  The Court then reviewed contempt cases, 
construing them to mean (1) both chambers of Congress have “not only 
such powers as are expressly granted to them by the Constitution, but 
such auxiliary powers as are necessary and appropriate to make the 
 
55.  Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955). 
56.  19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 234 (1821). 
57.  Id. 
58.  8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453 (1874). 
59.  Id. at 458. 
60.  Some cases bore on the question of congressional oversight power by implication.  
For example, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880), the Court held that Congress’s 
contempt finding was improper because the underlying investigation amounted to 
congressional usurpation of a judicial function.  103 U.S. at 192–93.  So, while silent as to 
congressional power to investigate, it clearly delineated, by negative inference, a zone of 
inquiry that was beyond any such power. 
61.  273 U.S. 135 (1927). 
62.  Id. at 161. 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. at 165–66 (citing opinions in Massachusetts, New York, Wisconsin, West 
Virginia, Missouri, and South Carolina). 
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express powers effective,”65 and (2) neither chamber is “invested with 
‘general’ power to inquire into private affairs and compel disclosures, 
but only with such limited power of inquiry” as is necessary to support 
its express and implied powers.66  
Ultimately, the Court held that “the power of inquiry—with process 
to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative 
function.”67  The Court further articulated: 
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the 
absence of information respecting the conditions which the 
legislation is intended to affect or change . . . .  Experience has 
taught that mere requests for such information often are 
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not 
always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are 
essential to obtain what is needed.  All this was true before and 
when the Constitution was framed and adopted. . . .  Thus there 
is ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional 
provisions which commit the legislative function to the two 
houses are intended to include this attribute to the end that the 
function may be effectively exercised.68 
In the Court’s view, Congress cannot legislate without information, 
and therefore congressional power to inform must derive from the 
constitutional structure.69  Thereafter, Supreme Court recognition of 
congressional oversight power solidified.  As Chief Justice Warren 
noted in Quinn v. United States, 
There can be no doubt as to the power of Congress, by itself or 
through its committees, to investigate matters and conditions 
relating to contemplated legislation.  This power, deeply rooted 
in American and English institutions, is indeed co-extensive with 
the power to legislate.  Without the power to investigate—
including of course the authority to compel testimony either 
through its own processes or through judicial trial—Congress 
could be seriously handicapped in its efforts to exercise its 
constitutional functions wisely and effectively.70 
 
65.  Id. at 173. 
66.  Id. at 173–74.  
67.  Id. at 174. 
68.  Id. at 175. 
69.  Id. 
70.  349 U.S. 155, 160–61 (1955) (footnotes omitted). 
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Recognizing congressional oversight’s important function in the 
American governmental structure, the Supreme Court confirmed 
oversight is grounded in the Constitution. 
3. The Executive  
Even the Executive, which most often falls under the unpleasant 
scrutiny of congressional investigators, acknowledges the 
constitutionality, if not the constitutional basis, of the exercise.  The 
Office of Legal Counsel advised President Reagan’s Attorney General 
that 
[i]t is beyond dispute that Congress may conduct investigations 
in order to obtain facts pertinent to possible legislation and in 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of current laws. . . .  Although 
the Constitution does not explicitly grant any power of inquiry to 
Congress, Congress asserted such a right shortly after the 
adoption of the Constitution.71 
Similarly, a Clinton Administration communication to Congress 
recognized that “[t]he oversight process is, of course, an important 
underpinning of the legislative process.”72  Thus, the Executive 
acknowledges Congress’s legitimate authority to conduct oversight but 
resists affirmatively conceding that such authority flows directly from 
the Constitution.  
C. The Scope and Limitations of Congressional Oversight 
While the constitutional authority to conduct congressional 
oversight is well established, the scope of that authority is a much more 
complicated subject.  Scope and limitation of congressional oversight are 
borne of conflict and thus intersect with the subject matter of this 
Article.  Sources of limitation on congressional authority may derive 
from judicial opinions, subject resistance, investigative jurisdiction, 
congressional self-regulation, and interbranch dispute.  Limitation on 
oversight authority, especially involving interbranch conflict, is in 
dispute and largely unsettled.  The following subsections chart the 
discernable scope and limits in this amorphous area. 
 
71.  Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Exec. 
Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60 (1985) (footnote omitted). 
72.  Letter from Robert Raben, Assistant Att’y Gen., to John Linder, Chairman, House 
Subcomm. on Rules & Org. of the House 1 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Assistant Att’y Gen. 
Raben Letter to Chairman Linder]. 
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1. Limited Paths to Judicial Resolution 
While courts have had occasion to consider interbranch 
congressional oversight disputes, the case law is sparse and unsettled.  A 
paucity of definitive case law is understandable considering that such 
disputes rarely move into litigation.  Even when congressional oversight 
disputes reach the courts, the judiciary confronts traditional reluctance 
to insert itself into disputes between the political branches. 
Professor Paul Freund cautioned that “[i]n the eighteenth-century 
Newtonian universe that is the Constitution, an excessive force in one 
direction is apt to produce a corresponding counterforce.”73  However, 
in the modern universe of quantum theory, a more apt analogy for the 
courts in the congressional oversight context is the Heisenberg 
Uncertainty Principle74: the act of court review itself—its mere gaze—
could have unintended and damaging consequences to the constitutional 
scheme.75 
There are several routes through which congressional oversight 
disputes have reached Article III courts.  The most common has been in 
the context of a criminal prosecution for contempt of Congress.76  There 
 
73.  Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term—Foreword: On Presidential 
Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 20 (1974). 
74.  In 1927, at a research institute in Copenhagen, Denmark, physicist Werner 
Heisenberg had an epiphany about the nature and limits of physical knowledge.  Specifically, 
at the subatomic level, the act of observing alters the reality being observed.  For example, if 
one tries to view an electron, one needs a measuring device such as light or radiation.  
However, the energy emitted from the chosen device will alter the course of the electron 
itself.  See Jan Hilgevoord & Jos Uffink, The Uncertainty Principle, THE STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 8, 2001), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-uncertai
nty/ (last updated July 3, 2006), archived at http://perma.cc/3UB-F57Q. 
75.  See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 20, Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01332-
ABJ) [hereinafter Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss], ECF No. 13-1 (urging the court 
not to reach the merits of the interbranch dispute over executive branch materials 
subpoenaed by Congress and subject to an assertion of executive privilege by President 
Obama because “[a]n assumption of jurisdiction here would . . . threaten to alter permanently 
the relationship among the Branches”). 
76.  See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 110 (1963) (considering an appeal by 
a private citizen following his conviction for contempt of Congress for failure to answer 
questions posed by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities); 
Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 607 (1962) (affirming a conviction for criminal 
contempt of Congress where refusal to answer questions implicated self-incrimination in a 
state court prosecution); McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382–83 (1960) (affirming a 
conviction for criminal contempt in the face of, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment challenge to 
the underlying subpoena’s breadth); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959) 
(affirming a conviction for criminal contempt of Congress in the face of a First Amendment 
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are some cases that arise out of criminal prosecution for crimes against 
Congress,77 and others brought by parties seeking to enjoin or quash 
congressional subpoenas.78  More rarely, courts have had occasion to 
consider a writ of habeas corpus against the appropriate agent of 
Congress itself.79  The Supreme Court has heard tort actions against the 
Sergeant-at-Arms of the U.S. House of Representatives80 and against 
 
challenge); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 215 (1957) (reversing a criminal contempt 
conviction based on a violation of the due process clause in light of committee’s questioning 
that had little nexus to the matter under inquiry); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 165 
(1955) (ordering entry of a judgment of acquittal where a defendant appealed his criminal 
contempt conviction on the grounds that he had invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953) (affirming the 
reversal of a contempt conviction because the committee exceeded its authority); Sinclair v. 
United States, 279 U.S. 263, 284, 288, 299 (1929) (affirming a conviction for contempt in 
connection with the Teapot Dome scandal); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the criminal contempt of Congress statute in the context of 
an appeal from conviction); United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1970) 
(reviewing a street gang member’s conviction for contempt of Congress for failure to testify, 
while under congressional subpoena, before a Senate subcommittee); Tobin v. United States, 
306 F.2d 270, 271, 275–76 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (reversing a contempt conviction of the Executive 
Director of the New York Port Authority by finding the committee’s request exceeded its 
mandate); Fields v. United States, 164 F.2d 97, 97–98, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (affirming 
conviction for contempt of Congress). 
77.  See, e.g., United States v. Poindexter, 727 F. Supp. 1501, 1502 (D.D.C. 1989) 
(addressing a subpoena of presidential records in a prosecution for false statements to, and 
obstruction of, Congress); United States v. North, 713 F. Supp. 1448, 1449–50 (D.D.C. 1989) 
(quashing a subpoena of former President Ronald Reagan to appear in a criminal prosecution 
for perjury before Congress). 
78.  Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 492–93 (1975) (reviewing an 
appeal brought by organization bank depositor seeking to enjoin the implementation of a 
congressional subpoena for organization’s records directed to the bank). 
79.  In such cases, Congress is the detaining authority because it has exercised inherent 
contempt power and detained an uncooperative target by means of the Sergeant-at-Arms of 
one of either the House or Senate.  See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 151–52 
(1935) (reversing the appellate court’s grant of relief on a writ of habeas corpus, finding that 
Congress has the power to punish a completed act by means of inherent contempt power); 
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 180 (1927) (reversing a district court order discharging a 
Senate witness from custody because the investigation of corruption aided the legislative 
function); Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 530–32, 548 (1917) (granting relief on a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by a New York district attorney who was arrested for contempt by the 
U.S. House of Representatives).   
80.  See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 204–06 (1821) (affirming a demurrer 
judgment entered for the defendant Sergeant-at-Arms that barred an action in trespass for 
false imprisonment, assault, and battery by a person held in contempt of Congress for an 
attempt to bribe a member). 
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the Speaker of the House.81 
One district court considered oversight power in the context of a 
motion by a congressional subcommittee chair to obtain grand jury 
material.82  More recently, Congress, as a body and through 
subcomponent parties, has sought enforcement of its subpoenas against 
the Executive Branch in civil court proceedings.83  In addition, a 
congressional component sought to vindicate statutory investigative 
power against Vice President Richard Cheney.84  In one notable case, 
the D.C. Circuit had occasion to address an action brought by the U.S. 
Department of Justice seeking to enjoin a private party from complying 
with a congressional subpoena.85 
2. Legal Precedent on Congressional Oversight 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized an extremely broad 
congressional mandate to conduct oversight.  In Barenblatt v. United 
States,86 the Court suggested the “scope of the power of inquiry . . . is as 
penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and 
appropriate under the Constitution.”87  In another case, the Court 
described the power as “broad.”88  As such, the courts are predisposed 
to give Congress wide latitude in terms of legitimate jurisdictional 
 
81.  Stewart v. Blaine, 8 D.C. (1 MacArth.) 453, 457 (1874) (shielding the Speaker from 
liability for executing an inherent contempt order because it would be “monstrous . . . to hold 
him liable . . . for merely obeying an order of the House”). 
82.  In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1302, 1304–05 (M.D. 
Fla. 1977) (granting a motion by a congressional subcommittee chairman for copies of 
documents related to a grand jury proceeding once the jury had been discharged, subject to 
issuance of a congressional subpoena to the relevant U.S. Attorney). 
83.  Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 
726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (considering a Senate committee challenge to an assertion of 
executive privilege by President Nixon as a basis for withholding information sought by a 
subpoena); Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3 (D.D.C. 
2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008).  
84.  See Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53, 74 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding the dispute 
nonjusticiable given the absence of a congressional subpoena). 
85.  United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 122–23 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(addressing an action brought by the Department of Justice against a telephone carrier 
seeking to enjoin its compliance with a subpoena issued by the House of Representatives in 
connection with a congressional investigation into warrantless national security wiretaps). 
86.  360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
87.  Id. at 111. 
88.  Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 901 
interests in oversight matters.  However, as discussed more fully below, 
this formulation is not without limits.89   
A number of cases recognize the subject-matter breadth of 
congressional investigative power.  First, Congress may investigate 
subjects relevant to its consideration of prospective legislation.90  This 
rationale hews closest to the constitutional theory animating oversight 
power: that the power to investigate is incident to legislative power.91  
For example, in Quinn v. United States, the Supreme Court observed 
that “[t]here can be no doubt as to the power of Congress . . . to 
investigate matters and conditions relating to contemplated 
legislation.”92  This is a temporally prospective endeavor, meaning 
present inquiry will inform future policy judgments. 
 Second, the Supreme Court recognizes congressional power to 
investigate the administration of existing laws.  In Watkins v. United 
States,93 Chief Justice Warren observed that congressional oversight 
power “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing 
laws” in addition to contemplated legislation.94  Here, Congress is 
interested in whether its enactments and policy preferences are being 
followed.95  This present tense rationale also more closely implicates the 
activities of the other branches of the federal government, in which the 
judiciary is reviewing and construing existing law while the Executive is 
assisting the President with the obligation to “take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed.”96  As such, the stage begins to set for 
interbranch conflict over matters of congressional oversight. 
A logical corollary to a power to investigate the administration of 
the laws is a power that “comprehends probes into departments of the 
 
89.  See id. (observing that, “broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited”). 
90.  See, e.g., Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 111–12 (“Congress may only investigate into those 
areas in which it may potentially legislate . . . .”). 
91.  See id. 
92.  349 U.S. 155, 160 (1955); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187 (acknowledging 
congressional power to conduct “inquiries concerning . . . proposed or possibly needed 
statutes”). 
93.  354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
94.  Id. at 187. 
95.  See Charles M. Cameron & B. Peter Rosendorff, A Signaling Theory of 
Congressional Oversight, 5 GAMES & ECON. BEHAVIOR 44, 46 (1993) (observing that 
oversight may constitute a “credible signal about the committee’s resoluteness . . . and may 
have dramatic effects on its behavior” with respect to policy choices). 
96.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.”97  
Such investigations have rationales rooted in the present and the future.  
Private parties, especially contractors and grantees of the federal 
government, may be swept within the ambit of these government 
malfeasance investigations.  However, in inquiries motivated by this 
rationale, the Executive Branch will be in the crosshairs as a regular 
matter.  The Supreme Court has even recognized that “[v]igilant 
oversight by Congress also may serve to deter Presidential abuses of 
office, as well as to make credible the threat of impeachment.”98  With a 
power, or perhaps obligation, to investigate the activities of coordinate 
branches of government, the die is cast for constitutional conflict.  
As such, there are three principal legal rationales for congressional 
investigative power: prospective legislation, present execution of law, 
and government misconduct.  However, as a functional matter in the 
real world of politics, there are somewhat different incentives that shape 
oversight conduct by Congress and its members.  
3. Functional Congressional Oversight Goals  
Oversight disputes play out in a variety of circumstances, such as 
exchanging letters prompted by a congressional committee request for 
documents, requesting staff- or member-level briefings, debating the 
scheduling and scope of hearings or briefings, haggling over the 
availability and appropriateness of hearing witnesses, and negotiating 
security protocols for sensitive documents.  Congressional committee 
chairs can escalate a dispute by issuing subpoenas or making phone calls 
to senior administration officials.  If things have really gone off the rails, 
the White House might assert executive privilege in the face of a 
congressional move to hold an executive branch official in contempt.99  
All of these disputes have the feel of tug-of-war over practical line-
drawing about the quantity and nature of information to which Congress 
is entitled. 
In practice, there are complex and dynamic motivations for 
congressional oversight.  The Congressional Oversight Manual lists a 
 
97.  Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
98.  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982).  Nixon addressed presidential 
immunity from suit and was not a case evaluating the constitutional bases of oversight, so this 
quotation is more functional observation than sanction.  Id. at 733.  
99.  See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. 
O.L.C. 27, 27–28 (1981) (advising the President that his executive privilege applied to 
documents requested by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce). 
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ranging set of purposes: ensuring executive compliance with legislative 
intent, improving the efficiency and effectiveness of governmental 
operations, evaluating program performance, preventing executive 
encroachment on legislative functions, investigating misconduct and 
waste, assessing agency and executive officer performance, establishing 
federal financial priorities, ensuring that executive policies reflect the 
public interest, and protecting individual rights and liberties.100  
Members and committees of Congress may also employ oversight as a 
means of promoting or enforcing policy preferences101 and encouraging 
government transparency.102  Congress’s self-conception of the goals of 
oversight transcends the case law to date. 
One undeniable incentive for congressional oversight is partisanship.  
When the President is from one political party and the other party 
controls either the House or Senate, or both,103 there is a strong 
incentive to use congressional oversight as a partisan bludgeon.104  There 
is a wealth of political science research that demonstrates the correlation 
between divided government and increased volume and intensity of 
congressional oversight.105  During these times, congressional 
committees can develop salient political themes of corruption, 
incompetence, and policy failure.106  In addition, sometimes there are 
political benefits to picking a process fight over documents or testimony 
 
100.  KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 1–3. 
101.  See, e.g., McGrath, supra note 19, at 369–70 (“The research presented in this article 
underscores the importance of legislative competence to oversee the administration of 
popularly promulgated policies.  Without the threat of oversight hearings, the ‘inner check’ is 
hardly likely to maintain the balance between bureaucracy and democracy.”). 
102.  According to Representative Darrell Issa, “transparency and real effectiveness of 
government requires . . . the vigorous oversight and demanding of transparency by the 
committees.”  Campbell Brown (CNN television broadcast Feb. 3, 2010), transcript available 
at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1002/03/ec.01.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
K4YC-A9TV. 
103.  In line with political science lexicon, I refer to this phenomenon as “divided 
government.” 
104.  See Kriner & Schickler, supra note 19, at 521 (“Marshaling an original data set of 
more than 3,500 investigative hearings and over 50 years of public opinion data, we show that 
increased investigative activity in the hearing room significantly decreases the president’s job 
approval rating.”). 
105.  See supra note 19. 
106.  See Marshall, supra note 18, at 782. 
 904 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:881 
as a means, in itself, of generating confrontation with a president from 
the opposite party.107 
Occasionally, congressional oversight efforts appear to be designed 
to influence an ongoing adjudication.108  This can be particularly 
problematic from the executive branch perspective because Congress 
risks corrupting an adjudicative process in which parties have fixed due 
process rights.109  In a similar vein, congressional actors sometimes 
employ oversight as a means of influencing an ongoing executive branch 
rulemaking process in an effort to supplement the notice-and-comment 
process, among other formal means for Congress’s input.110  
Members of Congress have more personal, political, and institutional 
incentives to engage in congressional oversight.  Committee chairs may 
be able to use oversight as a platform to make a name for themselves in 
chambers teeming with members trying to distinguish themselves.111  
 
107.  Id. at 809 (“Regardless of whether he chooses to comply with a document request 
or to fight it, the President incurs serious political risks in responding to a congressional 
investigation.”). 
108.  A good example of this type of oversight is the Oversight Committee’s focus on the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) during the 112th Congress.  On April 20, 2011, the 
NLRB filed an unfair labor practices complaint against the Boeing Company (Boeing) 
related to allegations by the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.  
One month later, Chairman Issa and two subcommittee chairs sent a document request letter 
declaring that the Oversight Committee was “conducting oversight of recent legal actions” 
taken by the NLRB’s Office of General Counsel.  Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Health 
Care, D.C., Census and the Nat’l Archives, & Dennis Ross, Chairman, House Subcomm. on 
Fed. Workforce, U.S. Postal Serv., and Labor Policy, to Lafe E. Solomon, Acting Gen. 
Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Board (May 12, 2011).  During the ensuing dispute, which 
included a congressional subpoena, the NLRB took the position that the congressional 
requests would undermine important confidentiality interests designed to protect the integrity 
of an open enforcement action, that premature disclosure of such information would 
“seriously compromise the litigation,” and that such disclosure would “give one litigant an 
unfair advantage over another.”  See, e.g., Letter from Celeste J. Mattina, Acting Deputy 
Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Board, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform, Trey Gowdy, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C., 
Census and the Nat’l Archives, & Dennis Ross, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Fed. 
Workforce, U.S. Postal Serv., and Labor Policy 2 (May 27, 2011); Letter from Lafe E. 
Solomon, Acting Gen. Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations Board, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (July 26, 2011). 
109.  See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957). 
110.  See Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Exec. 
Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 60–61 (1985). 
111.  Matthew Dull & David C.W. Parker, Congressional Oversight: Overlooked or 
Unhinged?, LEGIS. STUD. SEC. NEWSL.: EXTENSION OF REMARKS, July 2012, at 2 (Am. 
Political Sci. Ass’n, Norman, Okla.) (discussing a body of political science scholarship finding 
that “committee hearings offer members and parties prominent venues for building 
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Historians largely credit wartime oversight efforts with Harry Truman’s 
ascent to Vice President and ultimately President.112  Congressional 
oversight represents an opportunity for a symbiotic relationship with a 
press corps that has incentives to write stories about scandal.  The press 
can bring Congress oversight leads or expose issues worthy of 
congressional attention, and Congress can provide the press with 
documents and testimony that drive stories.113 
In addition, unique congressional district considerations can fuel 
oversight efforts.  For example, Representative Michael Turner (R-OH) 
became engaged in efforts to reform the U.S. military’s sexual assault 
prevention and response efforts due to a grisly homicide of a Marine 
whose family resides in his district.114  Part of his reform efforts included 
exacting oversight of ongoing military sexual assault prevention 
activities.115  Similarly, interest groups may be the primary advocates for 
certain oversight priorities that eventually find a congressional patron. 
Finally, a congressional committee or actor may engage in punitive 
oversight.  A committee may seek retribution for some act by an 
executive branch entity or official by means of its oversight power.116  
Thus, the oversight enterprise would be designed to punish, as either a 
deterrence or retributive matter, rather than inform a legislative 
judgment.  While punishment may be a true animating force in a given 
oversight action, it is hard to establish as an isolated factual matter.  
 
reputations, contrasting government incompetence with their own commitment to good 
government”). 
112.  See ROBERT DALLECK, HARRY S. TRUMAN 12 (2008); see also DAVID 
MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 285–87 (1992). 
113.  For a story that reveals a colorful version of this symbiotic relationship between 
journalists and oversight activities, see Mark Leibovich, How to Win in Washington, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG., July 7, 2013, at 18, 22. 
114.  See Congressman Turner Leads Efforts to Protect Sexual Assault Survivors in 
Military Justice System, TURNER.HOUSE.GOV (Nov. 6, 2013), http://turner.house.gov/media-
center/press-releases/congressman-turner-leads-efforts-to-protect-sexual-assault-survivors-in, 
archived at http://perma.cc/NT86-XJE2.  See also his campaign website article, Combating 
Sexual Assault in Our Military, MIKETURNER.COM (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.miketurner.co
m/blog/2011/04/17/combating-sexual-assault-in-our-military/, archived at http://perma.cc/3L85
-CPCF, in which he discusses the sexual assault and murder of Lance Corporal Maria 
Lauterbach by a senior enlisted member of her unit.  She grew up in Dayton, Ohio.  Id. 
115.  See Combating Sexual Assault in Our Military, supra note 114. 
116.  Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 545–46 (1917).  But see Anderson v. Dunn, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228–29 (1821) (recognizing a limited punitive power for the House of 
Representatives to punish a non-member on facts implicating the constitutional provision 
allowing Congress to punish its own membership). 
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Human motivations are dynamic, complex, and sometimes self-
contradictory; Congress’s motivations are no different. 
One can debate whether these incentives translate into appropriate 
levels, and types, of oversight activities.  Social science literature and 
public policy commentary are rife with lamentations that Congress has 
abdicated its oversight responsibilities117 to the benefit of a growing and 
unchecked Executive Branch.118  Some commentators suggest that there 
are significant disincentives to conducting robust oversight.119  It can be 
an unpleasant experience.120  Others take the view that congressional 
structure and incentives lead to emphasis on less meaningful 
oversight.121  There is also a camp that believes congressional oversight 
is on the upswing since Watergate122 or the New Deal.123 
 
117.  See, e.g., MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON 
ESTABLISHMENT 67–70 (1977); John F. Bibby, Congress’ Neglected Function, in REPUBLICAN 
PAPERS 477 (Melvin R. Laird ed., 1968); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, 
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
165, 165 (1984) (“Scholars often complain that Congress has neglected its oversight 
responsibility: despite a large and growing executive branch, Congress has done little or 
nothing to oversee administrative compliance with legislative goals.”); Morris S. Ogul, 
Congressional Oversight: Structures and Incentives, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 207, 207–
21 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1977); James B. Pearson, Oversight: A 
Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 277, 281 (1975) 
(“Paradoxically, despite its importance, congressional oversight remains basically weak and 
ineffective.”). 
118.  See generally PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE 
POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009). 
119.  See Ogul, supra note 117, at 209. 
120.  Indeed, some materials describe congressional staffers who feel demoralized by 
executive branch intransigence.  See, e.g., PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, THE ART OF 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT: A USER’S GUIDE TO DOING IT RIGHT 9 (2009) (noting that 
“[m]eaningful congressional oversight is hard work” and warning congressional investigators 
to “expect personal attacks” (title case removed)); MORTON ROSENBERG, THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A PRIMER ON THE 
PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 65 (2009), available 
at http://www.constitutionproject.org/manage/file/175.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4PYV-
2LQ6 (noting that due to “a lengthy period of legislative passivity in the face of serious 
executive challenges . . . there remains in Congress a palpable sense of loss of institutional 
regard, loyalty, and self-respect”). 
121.  See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 117, at 165 (arguing that congressional 
incentive structure leads to “preference for one form of oversight over another, less-effective 
form”). 
122.  See JOEL D. ABERBACH, KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE: THE POLITICS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT, at ix (1990) (“Congressional oversight activity has increased 
dramatically since the early 1970s.”). 
123.  See Joel D. Aberbach, Changes in Congressional Oversight, 22 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 493, 493 (1979) (“Congress has shown increasing concern about oversight as the 
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Understanding the complex motivations for congressional oversight 
is important when one is negotiating or litigating with Congress.  Most 
of these functional rationales and incentives can be tethered to the 
formal legal rationales: prospective legislation, present execution of law, 
and government misconduct.124  However, some of them—like 
transparency, adjudication interference, and rulemaking influence—are 
harder to square with the Supreme Court’s vision of the constitutional 
basis for oversight.  As such, the next section addresses legal precedent 
on the limits of congressional oversight. 
4. Limits on Congressional Oversight 
While Congress’s power to investigate is broad, it “is not 
unlimited.”125  First, an oversight inquiry must be grounded in a 
congressional effort to exercise its legislative function.126  The Court has 
noted that “[n]o inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in 
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress.”127 
Based on the legal precedents, two types of potential limitations 
emerge: jurisdictional and relative.  A jurisdictional limitation suggests 
that the purpose of the inquiry itself either lacks proper congressional 
authority or a valid constitutional rationale.  Congressional oversight 
power is “limited to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular 
house ‘has jurisdiction’ and in respect of which it rightfully may take 
other action.”128  For example, as noted in Watkins v. United States,129 
Congress does not have “general authority to expose the private affairs 
of individuals without justification in terms of the functions of the 
Congress.”130 
In contrast, a relative limitation occurs when the purpose or subject 
matter of the congressional inquiry is jurisdictionally sound but the 
congressional need is insufficient to overcome countervailing interests in 
 
federal bureaucracy has expanded in size and program initiation has passed to the executive 
branch.”). 
124.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
125.  Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957). 
126.  See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176–77 (1927) (upholding investigation 
where “the object of the investigation and of the effort to secure the witness’s testimony was 
to obtain information for legislative purposes”). 
127.  Watkins, 354 U.S. at 187. 
128.  McGrain, 273 U.S. at 170 (characterizing, with approval, the holding in Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880)). 
129.  354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
130.  Id. at 187. 
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confidentiality or other competing values.  Relative limitations are 
analytically messy.  They involve weighing competing, often legitimate, 
claims by Congress and the subject of its investigative request.  They 
also represent the vast majority of interbranch oversight disputes.  Of 
course, Congress’s litigation model envisions very little limitation on 
oversight power, whereas everything—outside of a jurisdictional bar to 
oversight—is subject to discussion and limitation in the executive 
branch transactional model.131  
a. Jurisdictional Limitations on Oversight 
Jurisdictional limitations focus on the motives of Congress as they 
relate to the powers granted to the three branches by the Constitution.  
Could Congress investigate a function firmly committed to the judiciary 
or Executive such that it had no plenary ability to legislate in that area?  
Some precedent suggests the answer is no.  For example, in Barenblatt v. 
United States,132 the Court held:  
Since Congress may only investigate into those areas in which it 
may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into 
matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the 
other branches of the Government.  Lacking the judicial power 
given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into matters that are 
exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.  Neither can it supplant 
the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive.133 
Thus, Barenblatt suggests that congressional oversight, like the broader 
legislative power, is limited in areas committed to the other branches by 
the Constitution.  
Some of the old oversight cases enforced such jurisdictional 
limitations.  In Kilbourn v. Thompson,134 the Supreme Court held that 
Congress exceeded its authority when it directed a committee to 
investigate a matter that was inherently judicial.135  Similarly, in Marshall 
v. Gordon,136 the Supreme Court granted habeas relief for the district 
attorney for the Southern District of New York (the forerunner to U.S. 
attorney) because detention for contempt on the basis of an intemperate 
 
131.  See infra Parts III.A–B. 
132.  360 U.S. 109 (1959). 
133.  Id. at 111–12. 
134.  103 U.S. 168 (1880).  
135.  Id. at 192–93. 
136.  243 U.S. 521 (1917). 
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letter transcended the implied right to preserve the legislative process 
and crossed into the judicial role of enforcement of general criminal 
laws.137 
However, as previously noted, oversight disputes routinely occur in 
the absence of judicial involvement and are resolved informally.138  
Jurisdictional arguments, even if conceptually sound, are nearly 
impossible to enforce at the investigative initiation phase.139  Congress 
does not have meaningful self-regulation, and unless things escalate to 
the point of a criminal or civil contempt proceeding or a constitutional 
crisis, it is unlikely that there will be any judicial involvement in a 
jurisdictional determination.  Therefore, as a practical matter, 
jurisdictional limitations are brought to bear on Congress in the same 
manner as relative limitations: as a function of the resolve and leverage 
of the resisting party. 
For its part, the Executive seeks to enforce jurisdictional limits on 
the scope of congressional oversight with only marginal results.  For 
example, one dispute related to a congressional request for documents 
related to Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan’s service in the Executive 
in an effort to ascertain whether she should recuse herself from 
decisions on pending or potential litigation related to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, commonly known as 
Obamacare.140  In response, the Department of Justice expressed 
“serious separation-of-powers concerns regarding this congressional 
inquiry” because it could encroach on the Judicial Branch and its 
“purpose . . . falls outside the scope of Congress’s oversight authority.”141 
While the Justice Kagan documents implicate judicial interests, the 
Executive also believes Congress has no jurisdictional power to 
 
137.  Id. at 530–32, 543–44 (reviewing historical instances of exercise of inherent 
congressional contempt power and noting that in several instances “it would seem that the 
difference between the legislative and the judicial power was also sometimes forgotten”). 
138.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
139.  In the judicial context, procedures exist to resolve jurisdictional issues at the 
initiation phases of litigation.  No such procedures exist in the congressional investigation 
context, so an inquiry undertaken without constitutional power to do so will proceed 
unchecked until it meets resistance by the Executive or, perhaps at a later crisis stage, the 
judiciary. 
140.  See Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Lamar S. Smith, 
Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 6, 2012). 
141.  Id. at 1. 
 910 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:881 
encroach on executive functions.142  According to the Reagan-era Office 
of Legal Counsel, “Congress may not conduct investigative or oversight 
inquiries for the purpose of managing executive branch agencies or for 
directing the manner in which the Executive Branch interprets and 
executes the law.”143   
This perspective is hard to reconcile with the pronouncement in 
Watkins v. United States144 that congressional oversight power 
“encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing 
laws.”145  Further, it becomes readily apparent that the categorical 
declaration by the Executive Branch relies on lines of demarcation that 
are impossible to decipher with clarity.  If a committee’s oversight effort 
in a given case is designed to affect a particular policy, how can the 
Executive Branch enforce whether the questions are designed to 
influence executive branch behavior or inform other congressional 
actors about policy choices?  These are the type of political questions 
that bedevil courts as they search for judicially manageable standards.  
The epistemology of congressional oversight motivation, and its 
expression, is amorphic. 
 Moreover, the Barenblatt formulation on exclusivity146 is easier to 
recite than to apply due to the power-blending among the three 
branches incident to the constitutional design.  The Constitution does 
not offer “a complete division of authority between the three 
branches.”147  As Justice Jackson famously noted, the Constitution 
“enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy 
but reciprocity.”148  Therefore, it can be analytically challenging to find 
powers that can be properly characterized as “exclusive” to one branch. 
One notable modern-era dispute between Congress and the White 
House brings to light the challenges facing the Executive in raising 
jurisdictional arguments.149  During President George W. Bush’s 
 
142.  See Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the Exec. 
Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 60 (1985). 
143.  Id. 
144.  354 U.S. 178 (1957). 
145.  Id. at 187. 
146.  See Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111–12 (1959). 
147.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). 
148.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
149.  See Assertion of Exec. Privilege Concerning the Dismissal and Replacement of 
U.S. Att’ys, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3 (June 27, 2007) (Opinion of Paul D. Clement, 
Solicitor General and Acting Attorney General). 
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Administration, the House Committee on the Judiciary investigated the 
forced resignation of nine U.S. Attorneys in late 2006.150  At the time, 
Democratic Representative John Conyers chaired the committee.151   
The matter involved the dismissal and replacement of several U.S. 
Attorneys under the well-recognized presidential powers grounded in 
the Appointments Clause.152  Under that Clause, subject to Senate 
advice and consent, the President appoints U.S. Attorneys and has 
independent power to remove them.153  There is no appreciable 
constitutional role for the House in the appointment and removal of 
U.S. Attorneys.154  The Executive asserted substantial Barenblatt 
exclusivity arguments that failed to provide relief to the White House.155 
As such, the Bush Administration challenged the committee’s 
jurisdiction to peer into deliberations of an exclusive, core presidential 
function.156  In recommending President Bush’s assertion of executive 
privilege, Acting Attorney General Paul Clement argued that the 
President’s power to remove presidentially appointed U.S. Attorneys 
was exclusive to the President: 
The Senate has the authority to approve or reject the 
appointment of officers whose appointment by law requires the 
advice and consent of the Senate (which has been the case for 
U.S. Attorneys since the founding of the Republic), but it is for 
the President to decide whom to nominate to such positions and 
whether to remove such officers once appointed. . . .  
Consequently, there is reason to question whether Congress has 
oversight authority to investigate deliberations by White House 
officials concerning proposals to dismiss and replace U.S. 
Attorneys, because such deliberations necessarily relate to the 
potential exercise by the President of an authority assigned to 
him alone.157 
 
150.  Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008). 
151.  Id. at 61. 
152.  Dismissal and Replacement, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2. 
153.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) 
(holding that appointee removal power, outside of impeachment proceedings, is the exclusive 
province of the President). 
154.  Impeachment power could be implicated but would not be a bar to a presidential 
decision to remove U.S. Attorneys. 
155.  Dismissal and Replacement, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3. 
156.  See Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 55. 
157.  Dismissal and Replacement, 31 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2–3. 
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The executive branch jurisdictional argument was rejected by the 
district court in the resulting civil contempt litigation, Committee on the 
Judiciary v. Miers.158  On interlocutory appeal, the D.C. Circuit granted 
a stay, and the parties eventually settled the resulting civil contempt 
litigation after the election of President Barack Obama.159  As a result, 
no appellate court reviewed the district court’s rejection of a 
jurisdictional challenge to the committee’s investigation.160 
Courts may be predisposed to side with congressional advocates on 
jurisdictional arguments because the concept of legislative purpose is 
expansive.  In a seminal work, James M. Landis argued: “It is true that 
. . . a committee must proceed with a legislative aim in mind, but, in 
determining whether it has so proceeded, inadequate conceptions of 
legislative purposes may unduly limit the field of inquiry.”161  Further, 
courts are generally inclined to defer to Congress as to its own 
motivations.162  
 
158.  558 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (suggesting that the Executive characterized the scope of the 
investigation “far too narrowly” because it was “not merely an investigation into the 
Executive’s use of his removal power but rather a broader inquiry into whether improper 
partisan considerations have influenced prosecutorial discretion”).  Broadening the justifying 
investigative rationale to include prosecutorial discretion probably further disturbed an 
Executive that believes such discretion, like removal power, is within its exclusive province. 
159.  See Agreement Concerning Accommodation, Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 
No. 08-cv-00409-JDB (D.D.C. dismissed Oct. 23, 2009). 
160.  A previous congressional investigation into certain clemency decisions provides 
another example of a jurisdictional argument advanced by the Executive.  Attorney General 
Janet Reno advised President Clinton that “it appears that Congress’ oversight authority does 
not extend to the process employed in connection with a particular clemency decision, to the 
materials generated or the discussions that took place as part of that process, or to the advice 
or views the President received in connection with a clemency decision” because it is an 
exclusively presidential power.  Assertion of Exec. Privilege With Respect to Clemency 
Decision, 23 Op. O.L.C. 1, 3–4 (1999) (Opinion of Attorney General Janet Reno).  That 
dispute never reached the courts. 
161.  James M. Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of 
Investigation, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 194 (1926).  The title is somewhat ironic in that 
Professor Landis does not see much conceptual room for limits.  Id. at 220.  The thrust of his 
argument is that Kilbourn v. Thompson was wrongly decided due to a superficially narrow 
view of legislative power.  See id. 214–20.  Aside from acknowledging that there must be some 
regulation external to Congress beyond “self-limitations inherent in the legislative process,” 
see id. at 220, he contemplates neither potential scenarios in which jurisdiction could be 
challenged successfully nor legitimate countervailing executive branch interests.  
162.  See id. at 218–19. 
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b. Relative Limitations on Oversight 
Most oversight disputes involve competing legitimate interests and 
thus implicate relative, rather than jurisdictional, limitations on 
Congress’s power of inquiry.  The paradigmatic dispute over relative 
limitation of oversight power occurs when Congress seeks information 
that would reveal executive branch deliberative processes, but such 
disputes may also arise if oversight activities affect other functions such 
as adjudications, prosecutions, diplomatic communiqués, pardons, or 
national security information.  Presidential assertions of executive 
privilege in the face of contempt citations capture the concept of 
competing interests at the ultimate stage of conflict escalation.163 
For example, in 2012, Chairman Issa requested documents from the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury and Internal Revenue Service seeking 
information about certain regulations implementing the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, including predecisional legal 
analysis of the proposed rules.164  In response, the Assistant Secretary of 
Treasury for Legislative Affairs wrote: 
In particular, you seek internal legal analysis and any other 
related documents that predate the proposed rule.  These 
materials implicate longstanding Executive Branch 
confidentiality interests.  It is well-established that agency staff 
and counsel must have the ability to . . . fulfill their statutory 
responsibilities. 
. . . . 
. . .  Nonetheless, we recognize the important oversight role 
of Congress, and we are committed to working with the 
Committee to provide the information you need to fulfill that 
role.  Accordingly, we are prepared to meet with your staff to 
discuss your particular oversight interests in this matter and to 
explore ways that we can accommodate those interests, while still 
protecting the important institutional interests described 
above.165 
 
163.  The President may assert executive privilege on jurisdictional grounds, but the vast 
majority of executive branch objections raise countervailing confidentiality concerns rather 
than challenge congressional power to investigate a topic.  Part V.A, infra, addresses law of 
executive privilege. 
164.  See Letter from Alastair M. Fitzpayne, Assistant Sec’y of Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep’t 
of Treasury, to Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform 1 (Oct. 
25, 2012). 
165.  Id. at 2. 
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There is no real question that the Oversight Committee has 
jurisdiction to evaluate tax regulations, so the Treasury Department 
raised no jurisdictional objection.166  Rather, it raised the concern that 
compliance with the request would undermine executive branch policy 
formulation policies.167  As discussed more fully in Part V, Congress 
does not believe that deliberative process privilege is applicable to 
oversight.  Furthermore, as discussed in the following section, the 
Treasury letter is a classic expression of the executive branch 
transactional model of oversight. 
In practice, both jurisdictional and relative limitations are almost 
always functional rather than legal.  Given the absence of pretrial 
screening or discovery management in the judicial context, jurisdictional 
and relative limitations take the form of arguments advanced by a party 
resisting oversight.  Moreover, the competing perspectives on the 
Constitution—the congressional litigation model and the executive 
transactional model—lead to vastly different conclusions as to whether 
oversight power must yield to objections. 
III. COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL VIEWS 
This Article argues that Congress and the Executive operate with 
fundamentally different views of the Constitution when it comes to 
congressional oversight.  Hierarchy and entitlement are the hallmarks of 
the congressional litigation perspective.168  In contrast, equality and 
accommodation characterize the Executive’s transactional model.169  
This section provides a detailed description of each branch’s views.170  It 
 
166.  See id. 
167.  Id. 
168.  See infra Part III.A. 
169.  See infra Part III.B. 
170.  When reviewing an early draft of this Article, Professor Christopher Green 
observed a logical link between the competing models presented here and the models 
outlined in Professors Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  In particular, they describe two 
approaches to settlement negotiations: a “Strategic Model,” which is a “relatively norm-free 
process centered on the transmutation of underlying bargaining strength into agreement by 
the exercise of power, horse-trading, and bluff,” and a “Norm-Centered Model” which 
focuses on “elements normally associated with adjudication—the parties and their 
representatives would invoke rules, cite precedents, and engage in reasoned elaboration.”  Id. 
at 973 (quoting Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976) (internal quotation mark 
omitted)).  Their models roughly track the ones described in this Article, where the Norm-
Centered Model tracks Congress’s litigation model and the Strategic Model tracks the 
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also includes congressional and executive authorities that betray the 
respective litigation and transactional sensibilities that lead to ships 
passing—or rather colliding—in the night. 
A. The Congressional Litigation Model 
Congress has adopted the language of criminal investigations and 
civil litigation.  It initiates “investigations,”171 sends “document 
requests,”172 issues “subpoenas,”173 conducts “depositions,”174 holds 
“hearings,”175 and finds “contempt.”176  Of late, some congressional 
committees have sent “preservation letters”177 to executive branch 
entities seeking to command them to preserve evidence notwithstanding 
 
Executive’s transactional model.  Their article also provides great insight into bargaining in a 
legal regime with uncertain outcomes.  See also Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks with Robert 
Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982) (explaining trials as settlement bargaining failure and the relative 
parties’ approach to risks that drive such failure). 
171.  See SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 41 (“Each . . . 
committee may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction . . . .”); HOUSE 
COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 415 (“Each committee may conduct at 
any time such investigations and studies as it considers necessary or appropriate in the 
exercise of its responsibilities . . . .”). 
172.  See SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 41; HOUSE 
COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 423. 
173.  See SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 41 (“Each 
standing committee . . . is authorized . . . to require by subpoena or otherwise the attendance 
of . . . witnesses and the production of . . . correspondence, books, papers, and 
documents . . . .”); HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 423 (“For 
the purpose of carrying out any of its functions and duties . . . a committee or subcommittee is 
authorized . . . to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance and testimony of such 
witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, 
and documents as it considers necessary.”). 
174.  See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON RULES, SENATE MANUAL, supra note 11, at 162–63 
(authorizing the Special Committee on Aging “to take depositions and other testimony”); 
HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 397 (“The Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform may adopt a rule authorizing and regulating the taking of 
depositions by a member or counsel of the committee, including pursuant to subpoena under 
clause 2(m) of rule XI . . . .”). 
175.  See HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, RULES ADOPTED, supra note 11, at 422 
(establishing “[h]earing procedures”). 
176.  See id. (“The chair may punish breaches of order and decorum, and of professional 
ethics on the part of counsel, by censure and exclusion from the hearings; and the committee 
may cite the offender to the House for contempt.”). 
177.  See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, to John Koskinen, Comm’r, IRS (June 16, 2014). 
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an existing statutory scheme of records preservation obligations under 
the Federal Records Act178 and Presidential Records Act.179 
Advocates of Congress begin with a premise of near unfettered 
congressional power in this sphere, subject only to the narrowest of 
exceptions.  During his distinguished tenure with the Congressional 
Research Service, Morton Rosenberg offered the quintessential 
congressional formulation of oversight power: 
Numerous Supreme Court precedents establish and support a 
broad and encompassing power in the Congress to engage in 
oversight and investigation that reaches all sources of 
information that enable it to carry out its legislative function.  In 
the absence of a countervailing constitutional privilege or a self-
imposed statutory restriction upon its authority, Congress and its 
committees, have virtually, plenary power to compel information 
needed to discharge its legislative function from executive 
agencies, private persons and organizations, and within certain 
constraints, the information so obtained may be made public.180 
Thus, Congress starts from the premise that, as a function of its 
position above the Executive in the oversight hierarchy, it is entitled to 
any and all information.  In the face of an objection, Congress will 
consider whether a narrow exception, one recognized by Congress, 
applies. 
1. Hierarchy   
Hierarchy characterizes Congress’s perspective on congressional 
oversight.  Congress believes, not unreasonably, that it has a supervisory 
role over the Executive when exercising its oversight function.181  
 
178.  44 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3107 (2012). 
179.  Id. §§ 2201–2207 (2012). 
180.  MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL 
INQUIRY 1 (1995). 
181.  See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Consolidated (I) Reply to Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and (II) Opposition to Defendant’s Cross-Motion For 
Summary Judgment, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder at 20, No. 12-cv-01332-
ABJ (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 2014), ECF No. 69 (asserting that congressional authority “to oversee 
the Executive Branch generally . . . is firmly rooted in Article I” of the U.S. Constitution).  
The concept of such hierarchical superiority, i.e., “over,” is embedded in the term “oversight” 
itself.  ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 3 (“Experience has shown that in order to engage in 
successful oversight, committees must establish their credibility with the executive 
departments and agencies they oversee early, often, consistently, and in a manner that evokes 
respect, if not fear.”).  Congress could also point to the reverse asymmetry associated with 
 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 917 
Congressional advocates note that “Congress’ right of access to 
executive branch information has been recognized by innumerable 
Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions.”182  In a typical 
assertion, one House committee chairman suggested that Congress’s 
broad investigative mandate renders it “necessary . . . to have unfettered 
access to executive branch information in order to be able to make 
sound legislative judgments.”183 
From the congressional perspective, top-line equality of the three 
branches of the federal government does not equate to equality in every 
interaction.  Courts, like Congress, have inherent authority to supervise 
their own proceedings,184 as well as to enforce their rules and orders.185  
A litigation model presumes a hierarchy in which Congress is above the 
Executive and in which the Executive is obligated to submit to 
congressional investigative authority.186  The Executive would generally 
concede that both congressional and executive officers must respect the 
presiding authority of a federal judge in a criminal or civil case.  For 
purposes of a criminal proceeding, even though an Assistant United 
States Attorney is an executive official representing executive branch 
interests, the judge stands in a supervisory—and inherently 
 
executive branch processes, such as criminal investigations or prosecutions of members of 
Congress or agency hearings or other regulatory actions in which Congress seeks to 
participate.  But see id. at 65 (“The Executive Branch and Congress must seek to work 
together as co-equal branches of government, and Congress must exercise its oversight 
function even when its leadership comes from the same political party as the President.” 
(emphasis added)). 
182.  ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 2.  
183.  H.R. REP. NO. 106-130, pt. 1, at 40 (1999) (expressing the additional views of 
Chairman Porter J. Goss, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of 
Representatives, on the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000). 
184.  See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–45 (1991) (affirming inherent 
power of federal courts to manage their own proceedings and to control the conduct of those 
who appear before them); United States v. Lopez, 765 F. Supp. 1433, 1459 (N.D. Cal. 1991) 
(“The court’s supervisory power . . . exists principally to allow the court to protect the 
integrity of the judicial process and to deter government misconduct.”), overruled on other 
grounds, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). 
185.  See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 796 (1987) 
(“The ability to punish disobedience to judicial orders is regarded as essential to ensuring that 
the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on 
other Branches.”). 
186.  In litigation, adversaries share baseline equality, but both submit to the 
hierarchical authority of the judge.  Congress sees its own role as presiding forum for 
oversight proceedings in the mode of a judge. 
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hierarchical—role with respect to the judicial proceeding.187  That judge 
expects an executive official to abide by court rules and orders.188  A 
judge could sanction a federal prosecutor189 or executive branch party 
litigant190 for obstruction, delay, or misconduct, including a finding of 
criminal contempt.191 
Congress believes it is entitled to the same sort of interbranch 
submission to congressional authority in its oversight proceedings.192  
Congress sees it as an affront that the Executive would micromanage 
congressional proceedings by attempting to substitute alternative 
witnesses, sources of information, scopes of request, or forms of 
 
187.  Some courts characterize regulation of federal prosecutors in criminal proceedings 
as grounded in their capacity as officers of the court.  See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1453–54 
(“When a court regulates a prosecutor’s ethical conduct, it regulates the prosecutor in his 
capacity as an officer of the court and thus there is no threat to the principle of separation of 
powers.”).  From this perspective, they are regulated in a judicial, Article III role rather than 
their status as executive officers, and thornier separation of powers questions may be 
sidestepped.  Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (“[A] federal 
court ‘may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the 
Constitution or the Congress.’  Nevertheless, it is well established that ‘[e]ven a sensible and 
efficient use of the supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or 
statutory provisions.’” (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985))).  
However, courts also expect executive branch clients to submit to judicial power to regulate 
Article III proceedings. 
188.  See Lopez, 765 F. Supp. at 1455 (holding that the U.S. Attorney General’s 
argument that federal prosecutors are exempt from local federal rules governing ethical 
conduct would arrogate essential judicial power and, as such, violate separation of powers). 
189.  See Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 262–63 (discussing sanctions available to 
federal courts to address misconduct by federal prosecutors, including an order to a 
prosecutor to show cause why she should not be disciplined, referral to a bar or the U.S. 
Department of Justice for investigation, or a finding of contempt of court for a Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure Rule 6 violation of grand jury secrecy); see also United States v. 
Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1463 (9th Cir. 1993) (“We have recognized that exercise of supervisory 
powers is an appropriate means of policing ethical misconduct by prosecutors.” (citations 
omitted)); United States v. Vetere, 663 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Under some 
circumstances, it may be appropriate to hold an Assistant [United States Attorney] in 
contempt of court.”). 
190.  See Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (reversing, on the 
merits, findings of contempt against senior executive officials in the Department of the 
Interior, including the Secretary, for alleged misconduct as party litigants, but assuming that 
such a finding could be proper if warranted). 
191.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a) (setting forth the procedures for criminal contempt); see 
also Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1464 (“[H]olding the prosecutor in contempt . . . can be adequate to 
discipline and punish government attorneys who attempt to circumvent the standards of their 
profession.”). 
192.  See, e.g., Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 1. 
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production based on executive branch presumptions about Congress’s 
legitimate interests.193 
2. Entitlement 
Entitlement in a litigation model captures the concept of fixed rights 
to information.  Congress believes it is entitled to virtually any executive 
branch information, on Congress’s timetable, absent a valid, formal 
assertion of executive privilege.194  A recent formulation of the 
congressional view can be found in Chairman Issa’s response to 
President Obama’s assertion of executive privilege in the Fast and 
Furious investigation: 
Courts have consistently held that the assertion of the 
constitutionally-based executive privilege—the only privilege 
that ever can justify the withholding of documents from a 
congressional committee by the Executive Branch—is only 
applicable with respect to documents and communications that 
implicate the confidentiality of the President’s decision-making 
process, defined as those documents and communications to and 
from the President and his most senior advisors.  Even then, it is 
a qualified privilege that is overcome by a showing of the 
committee’s need for the documents.195 
Congressional advocates also categorically reject many objections raised 
about oversight information requests on the grounds that they fall 
outside such narrow exceptions.196  
The role of precedent also tends to take on more importance in a 
litigation model.  If one’s view of congressional oversight power is that 
of an immutable and inherent entitlement to executive branch 
information, establishing a precedent of action demonstrates a tangible 
example of such entitlement that should govern prospective 
interactions.  For example, Congress obtained access to one of the 
President’s daily intelligence briefings (PDB)197 in connection with the 
9/11 Commission,198 creating a sense of entitlement to any subsequent 
 
193.  See, e.g., id. at 1, 6. 
194.  See, e.g., id. at 1. 
195.  Id.  
196.  See, e.g., id. at 4. 
197.  The President’s morning intelligence products usually come in the form of a PDB 
document. 
198.  The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 
commonly referred to as the 9/11 Commission, was a congressional, Article I, entity; its 
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PDB.  Congressional actors believe the Executive expects them to 
assume the role of the modern-day Sisyphus, pushing today’s boulder of 
oversight requests up (from) the Hill only to have it roll back down to 
be repeated tomorrow in a perpetual spirit-crushing exercise.  
In the eyes of Congress, there are congressional rules that must be 
followed, document requests that should be answered, subpoenas that 
must be satisfied, and witnesses that must appear.  As such, executive 
targets of congressional oversight requests face the binary status of 
compliance or noncompliance.  To Congress, noncompliance by 
executive officials eventually amounts to the crime of contempt.   
B. The Executive Branch Transactional Model 
The Executive’s transactional model envisions oversight as a 
negotiation process between two interested parties with compelling sets 
of interests that, when in conflict, must be resolved on the basis of the 
force of reason and bargaining leverage.  Transactional models reject 
the binary in-compliance/out-of-compliance perspective Congress brings 
to its information requests.  Rather, the Executive believes that 
congressional information needs must be weighed against executive 
confidentiality interests.  From the perspective of the White House, 
congressional information needs can often be satisfied in a number of 
ways.  Given the equality of the parties and the legitimate concerns 
implicated by certain requests, the Executive Branch sees no 
presumptive congressional right to define the manner, form, quantity, or 
messenger of the information to be provided. 
To the Executive, the role of precedent is persuasive rather than 
determinative, much as it is in a business transaction.  For example, the 
price a purchasing company pays for assets valued at $x of a debt-ridden 
party yesterday would likely be quite different than the purchase of the 
same assets, still valued at $x, owned by a target company with no 
pressing need or inclination to sell. 
 
information requests of the Executive were therefore congressional oversight requests from 
an analytical, separation of powers perspective.  See Daniel Marcus, The 9/11 Commission 
and the White House: Issues of Executive Privilege and Separation of Powers, 1 AM. U. NAT’L 
SECURITY L. BRIEF 19, 19–21 (2011).  In the highly politically charged aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, the White House acquiesced to 9/11 Commission requests for PDB material.  See, 
e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 261 (2004) (discussing relevant PDB materials provided to the 
Commission). 
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The transactional model also does not contemplate a neutral third 
party as the arbiter of the price and terms of the interaction.  There is a 
premium on leverage and self-help within the negotiation process—a 
process the Executive believes the Constitution requires.  A court ruling 
could short-circuit a present negotiation and may also establish fixed 
rights for future interactions, which the Executive believes could do 
violence to separation of powers.  
One of the most influential recitations of the transactional 
perspective held by the Executive Branch was set forth in President 
Ronald Reagan’s November 4, 1982, memorandum issuing guidance 
about congressional oversight requests: 
The policy of this Administration is to comply with 
Congressional requests for information to the fullest extent 
consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the 
Executive Branch. . . .  [E]xecutive privilege will be asserted only 
in the most compelling circumstances, and only after careful 
review demonstrates that assertion of the privilege is necessary.  
Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the 
Executive Branch have minimized the need for invoking executive 
privilege, and this tradition of accommodation should continue as 
the primary means of resolving conflicts between the Branches.199 
As such, in stark contrast to the binary congressional perspective, 
the Executive views negotiation between co-equals and accommodation 
among those parties as the mother’s milk of congressional oversight.  As 
articulated by President Reagan’s Attorney General William French 
Smith, “The accommodation required is not simply an exchange of 
concessions or a test of political strength.  It is an obligation of each 
branch to make a principled effort to acknowledge, and if possible to 
meet, the legitimate needs of the other branch.”200 
1. Equality 
The Executive does not accept the premise that it is a subordinate 
party in matters of congressional oversight.  Rather, like a business 
transaction, the Executive views the parties as normative equals at arm’s 
 
199.  Memorandum from President Ronald Reagan for the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies on Procedures Governing Responses to Congressional Requests 
for Information 1 (Nov. 4, 1982) (emphasis added). 
200.  Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to a Cong. Subpoena, 5 Op. O.L.C. 27, 31 
(1981). 
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length.  Accordingly, executive oversight responses often emphasize the 
“co-equality” of the branches in order to establish the legitimacy of 
resistance.201 
From an executive perspective, the equality principle also embeds a 
concept of branch autonomy articulated in Nixon v. Fitzgerald202: “The 
essential purpose of the separation of powers is to allow for independent 
functioning of each coequal branch of government within its assigned 
sphere of responsibility, free from risk of control, interference, or 
intimidation by other branches.”203  Thus, congressional pretention to 
unfettered access to executive information, as well as dictation of terms 
of such access, amounts to undue interference by a peer. 
2. Accommodation 
Accommodation in a transactional model relates to the method of 
outcome determination, but it flows from a view of constitutional 
design.204  Whereas Congress seeks to enforce a rule of entitlement, the 
Executive believes both branches share competing, legitimate 
interests.205  Thus, oversight dispute outcomes, like transactions, are 
primarily defined by the relative leverage possessed by each party in a 
given situation.  As a result, the parties’ interaction consists primarily of 
negotiation.   
In 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice communicated formal views 
on its obligations with respect to congressional oversight in connection 
with a House subcommittee hearing.206  In that letter, Assistant 
Attorney General Robert Raben explained the Executive’s protective 
goals: “In implementing the longstanding policy of the Executive 
Branch to comply with Congressional requests for information to the 
fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations 
 
201.  Of course, Congress also invokes its “coequal” status when it believes it is being 
stonewalled by the Executive. 
202.  457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
203.  Id. at 760–61 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
204.  See Neal Devins, Congressional–Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest 
Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111–16 (1996) (a section titled “The 
Competing Interests of Congress and the Executive”). 
205.  Id. at 113–14; see also Assertion of Exec. Privilege Over Commc’ns Regarding 
EPA’s Ozone Air Quality Standards and Cal.’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. 
Att’y Gen., slip op. at 3–5 (June 19, 2008) (opinion of Att’y Gen. Michael Mukasey) 
(assessing if the Committee’s need for the subpoenaed documents overcomes the executive 
privilege). 
206.  See Assistant Att’y Gen. Raben Letter to Chairman Linder, supra note 72, at 2–3. 
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of the Executive Branch, the Department’s goal in all cases is to satisfy 
legitimate legislative interests while protecting Executive Branch 
confidentiality interests.”207  As noted, the letter is consistent with 
executive branch policy in administrations of both political parties 
dating back at least as far as President Reagan.208 
The Department’s rhetorical use of “interests” is a form of resistance 
to a notion of congressional entitlement.  A concept of competing 
interests flows from the equality principle and embeds within it the 
legitimacy of executive branch concerns.  In stark contrast to a Congress 
entitled to almost anything subject only to the narrowest of exceptions, 
the Executive envisions the Constitution as requiring the balancing of 
interests.  Under this view, the Constitution requires the Executive to 
provide sufficient information to Congress for legislative purposes, 
subject to executive branch interests in confidentiality or other 
processes that may determine the time, manner, and scope of 
information provided. 
Furthermore, an accommodation process requires weighing 
competing interests and relative merits, and thus requires an assessment 
not just of executive branch interests but also of their merit vis-à-vis 
congressional need for the information.  A number of factors naturally 
come into play: 
 • the legitimacy and gravity of congressional need for the requested 
information; 
 • whether the request for the information is tailored to that need; 
 • the legitimacy and gravity of executive branch confidentiality 
interests implicated by the request; 
 • the ability to satisfy legitimate congressional needs with refined 
or narrowed requests; 
 • the availability of alternative sources of the requested 
information; 
 • historical practice, by both branches, with respect to similar 
requests; and 
 • the respective political will and leverage of the branches to pursue 
their positions. 
 
207.  Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
208.  See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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This list is descriptive in that it resembles executive branch analysis 
in practice.  It also has normative value.  Sensitive consideration of these 
factors should result in optimal congressional oversight activity while 
protecting executive branch interests.  However, who evaluates these 
factors, and by what mechanism, remains problematic in terms of 
separation of powers.  The question is whether this is a matter for the 
political processes, the courts, or both.   
C. The Two Models:  Self-Serving and Inapt 
Congress and the Executive derive great benefits that flow naturally 
from their respective models of choice.  Both models, however, fall short 
of their adopted analogy—whether litigation or transactional 
negotiation—in material respects.  Specifically, Congress, in acting as 
both an adversarial party and the arbiter in its own investigations, has 
failed to adopt procedural safeguards that are present in court, such as 
supervised discovery and protection of otherwise confidential 
information.  In contrast, the Executive transactional model provides for 
no arbiter at all, allowing the Executive to entrench itself when it holds 
the information Congress seeks. 
1. Litigation Model Benefits to Congress and Analogy Weaknesses 
Politically, Congress derives great benefit from its association with 
litigation by framing disputes with private parties and the Executive in 
the language of “compliance” or “non-compliance.”  By the time the 
Executive raises an objection to a congressional request, the press 
invariably frames the resulting stories the way Congress would like: as a 
“failure to comply” with a congressional request, or, even worse, a 
subpoena.209  Thus, from the first sign that the Executive may have 
objections to the scope or nature of the inquiry, whether legitimate or 
meritless, it is cast in a light that suggests lawlessness and wrongdoing.210  
The resulting political pressure caused by this negative frame also assists 
Congress in dislodging information from an Executive that benefits 
from inaction.211 
However, while Congress cloaks itself in the language of litigation 
and investigations, it has little respect for the procedural safeguards that 
 
209.  See Marshall, supra note 18, at 809–10. 
210.  Id. 
211.  Id. 
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courts have developed over centuries to bolster legitimacy.212  In fact, it 
has failed to create procedural opportunities to obtain relief for unduly 
burdensome requests, failed to establish meaningful privacy and non-
disclosure principles, and demonstrated hostility to common law 
privileges.  Moreover, Congress has failed to create any internal process 
for a neutral, or at least removed, arbiter to review objections raised by 
its discovery targets.  Instead, the chair of the relevant congressional 
committee rules on motions, notwithstanding the fact that the chair is 
often in a fundamentally adversarial posture to a witness or agency.  
Some procedural disparities derive from the fact that a legislative 
inquiry has a purpose other than the resolution of a case or controversy.  
The courts are quite clear that congressional investigations are not the 
same as criminal adjudications.213  However, interests in reputation,214 
procedural fairness,215 and public legitimacy216 apply in full force.  Thus, 
while Congress’s information gathering threatens concrete harms to 
individuals and entities, they are not entitled to “the full panoply” of 
procedural protections.217 
The congressional litigation model also differs from real litigation in 
that it lacks any meaningful supervision of the discovery process.  The 
American civil litigation discovery process already honors incredibly 
intrusive requests and costly information production.218  In fact, most 
countries with civil law traditions look upon our system of civil 
discovery with contempt due to what they see as litigation run amok.219  
 
212.  I address Congress’s lack of procedural safeguards and offer potential reform 
principles designed to bolster congressional oversight legitimacy in a subsequent draft article 
entitled Congressional Due Process.  As discussed there, both government officials and 
private parties confront spartan procedural protections in congressional investigations.  For 
purposes of this Article, it is important to note that at the time of requested enforcement, a 
congressional subpoena or contempt finding has not likely undergone any meaningful pre-
enforcement supervision or review. 
213.  See, e.g., United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (noting that a 
congressional inquiry is “an investigative proceeding and not a criminal proceeding”).  
214.  See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 118 (1963) (recognizing reputational 
interests in connection with a congressional hearing by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities). 
215.  See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957). 
216.  See, e.g., Scope of Cong. Oversight and Investigative Power With Respect to the 
Exec. Branch, 9 Op. O.L.C. 60, 61 (1985).  
217.  Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). 
218.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
219.  See, e.g., Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections on 
Its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 77 (1994) (“Foreign courts 
usually regard U.S. discovery requests as impermissibly broad and . . . refuse to execute such 
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As a result, many of them fail to honor our transnational discovery 
requests.220  By comparison, congressional discovery is vastly more 
unregulated and sprawling than even the civil litigation discovery 
process. 
In traditional civil litigation, the parties have numerous 
opportunities to register their objections to discovery requests.221  More 
importantly, they have procedures in place for review.  Under certain 
circumstances, civil litigants may seek interlocutory appeal in an effort 
to shield especially sensitive information from disclosure in the 
discovery context.222  Similarly, discovery is regulated in federal criminal 
investigations by means of various constitutional safeguards related to 
search and seizure, interrogations and confessions, and the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure.223 
In addition to an unsupervised discovery process, congressional 
investigations also offer little meaningful privacy or non-disclosure 
protections for those from whom it seeks information.  While there is a 
general presumption of a public right to observe court proceedings,224 
civil litigation includes procedural opportunities for litigants to seek 
protection from public disclosure for certain cognizable protected 
interests.225  Congress, however, does not offer enforceable protections 
for trade secrets or otherwise confidential information taken into its 
custody. 
Putting aside whether procedural safeguards or substantive 
privileges are available, if Congress refuses to yield, the issues are not 
going to be resolved until well after a party resisting oversight is in 
 
requests.” (footnote omitted)); Marat A. Massen, Note, Discovery for Foreign Proceedings 
After Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices: A Critical Analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1782 Jurisprudence, 
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 875, 877 (2010) (observing that “many civil law nations find America’s 
discovery system to be intrusive and fundamentally inconsistent with their own”).  
220.  See, e.g., Born, supra note 219, at 77. 
221.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4). 
222.  See Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12–13 (1918) (holding that a subpoenaed 
party may obtain an interlocutory appeal on refusal based on a claim of privilege if she 
stipulates she will comply with the court order upon a final adjudication). 
223.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16, 41. 
224.  See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980). 
225.  For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create a presumption against 
including Social Security numbers, birth dates, taxpayer identification numbers, minors’ 
names, or a financial account number in any filing.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a) (“Privacy 
Protection for Filings Made with the Court”).  It also authorizes a court, “for good cause,” to 
enforce a protective order requiring redactions or limiting a nonparty’s access to information. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(e) (“Protective Orders”). 
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serious legal jeopardy.  In a congressional investigation, objections 
related to discovery, protection of confidential information, and 
production of privileged information will not get reviewed by a neutral 
party until they are raised as a defense to a criminal contempt 
prosecution, a defense to civil contempt litigation, or on a writ of habeas 
corpus following an inherent contempt finding. 
The Speech and Debate Clause226 presents one of the principal 
complicating factors for subjects of congressional oversight.  Specifically, 
it grants absolute immunity to congressional actors whose conduct is 
undertaken in furtherance of legislative functions.227  As evidenced by 
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund,228 
immunity frustrates any judicial regulation of congressional discovery 
process either by means of a suit to enjoin or other litigation platform 
designed to quash a congressional subpoena.229 
The D.C. Circuit commented on the lack of discovery management 
in congressional investigations some fifty years ago in Tobin v. United 
States.230  The dispute involved the withholding of documents by the 
Executive Director of the Port of New York Authority, at the direction 
of the Governors of New York and New Jersey, on grounds that the 
scope of the congressional subpoena was overbroad.231  The court 
lamented that this discovery issue had to be resolved in the context of a 
criminal contempt prosecution.232  The court’s concern stemmed from 
the fact that a witness cannot receive a determination of his 
constitutional rights until he is subjected to criminal prosecution.  As 
such, the Tobin court recommended Congress create a method for 
allowing these determinations to be made prior to contempt by way of 
declaratory judgment.  Because no such method has been adopted, 
 
226.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
227.  Id. 
228.  421 U.S. 491 (1975).  
229.  Id. at 511. 
230.  306 F.2d 270, 275–76 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
231.  Id. at 271. 
232.  Id. at 276 (“Although this question is not before the Court, it does feel that if 
contempt is, indeed, the only existing method, Congress should consider creating a method of 
allowing these issues to be settled by declaratory judgment.  Even though it may be 
constitutional to put a man to guessing how a court will rule on difficult questions like those 
raised in good faith in this suit, what is constitutional is not necessarily most desirable.  
Especially where the contest is between different governmental units, the representative of 
one unit in conflict with another should not have to risk jail to vindicate his constituency’s 
rights.” (quoting United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 617 (D.D.C. 1961))). 
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however, contempt proceedings remain the sole process to secure a 
determination by a neutral arbiter.  Though the Tobin court ultimately 
reversed the judgment of conviction,233 relief is rare for a person who 
decides to risk the consequences of noncompliance.234 
Lack of management of congressional discovery represents obvious 
criminal peril for a private individual or non-federal entity.  In 
interbranch disputes, unbridled discovery takes on a separation of 
powers dimension.  The Supreme Court recognized, in Cheney v. U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia,235 a nexus between the 
crafting of discovery requests and separation of powers.236  Specifically, 
in Cheney, the Court compared “overly broad discovery requests” in 
civil litigation to the “narrow subpoena orders” in United States v. 
Nixon.237  It noted that, in Nixon, the “very specificity of the subpoena 
requests serve[d] as an important safeguard against unnecessary 
intrusion into the operation of the Office of the President.”238  While the 
calculus of sufficient showings may be different in the congressional 
oversight context, the scope of a discovery request clearly relates to the 
relative burden on the Executive. 
Finally, it bears mention that not all congressional actors share a 
sincere belief in the litigation model.  Congress is defined by its 
multipolarity.  Some congressional actors adopt the litigation model as a 
negotiating tactic.  In other words, they use the language of litigation, 
authority, entitlement, and outrage in order to increase the political 
pressure on the other side of the constitutional negotiation. 
2. Transactional Model Benefits to the Executive and Analogy 
Weaknesses 
The Executive Branch benefits from adopting the transactional 
model in a number of important respects.  First, the party with the 
advantage in the status quo ante will prevail in the event of inaction.  In 
the congressional oversight and investigations context, the Executive 
 
233.  Id. 
234.  Yellin v. United States is another such scarce example in which the Court offered a 
defendant rare relief by excusing the failure to answer questions on the grounds that the 
congressional subcommittee at issue failed to follow its own rules on executive session.  374 
U.S. 109, 122 (1963). 
235.  542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
236.  See id. at 387. 
237.  Id. at 386. 
238.  Id. at 387. 
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Branch resisting production of information will prevail when there is 
stalemate.  A transactional model inherently challenges congressional 
authority by means of its claim of equality and functionally limits the 
scope of congressional oversight by framing conflicts as competing, 
legitimate interests.  By rejecting an imperative obligation to comply 
with congressional subpoenas, the Executive Branch favors inaction and 
delay such that a subpoena becomes a form of constitutional negotiation 
rather than a categorical imperative.  In this way, everything is up for 
discussion.  
The executive branch transactional model breaks down in that it 
does not contemplate any role for judicial review.  A pure transactional 
model does not provide sufficient incentive for the Executive to 
cooperate with politically embarrassing or functionally burdensome 
oversight requests that are nevertheless legitimate.  Moreover, executive 
branch intransigence, whether principled or not, incurs costs to public 
confidence in the government.  
While judicial involvement is rare and problematic, it is an ever-
present possibility should the Executive overplay its hand—or perhaps 
even if it does not.  Furthermore, the courts are likely to be much less 
skeptical of congressional authority than the Executive.  Without a 
judicial Sword of Damocles overhead, there might not be enough 
incentive to negotiate in good faith as the Executive would like to 
suggest. 
3. Escalation into Constitutional Conflict 
In practice, oversight disputes are initially raised informally by 
means of conference calls and letter exchanges.  Generally, during such 
a conversation, an executive branch representative may raise 
confidentiality interests that could be damaged by the nature or scope of 
a congressional oversight request.  From its own perspective, “Executive 
Branch confidentiality interests” is shorthand for a position that (a) has 
likely been vetted through the Office of Legal Counsel as an Executive 
Branch-wide position and (b) could be grounds for an assertion of 
executive privilege.  Executive branch officials are sensitive to the fact 
that assertion of executive privilege is a power that belongs to the 
President alone.239  However, many congressional staffers are either 
unaware of, or find it tactically advantageous to ignore, that fact.  
 
239.  See, e.g., Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to Prosecutorial 
Documents, 25 Op. Att’y Gen., slip op. at 2 (Dec. 10, 2001). 
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In turn, congressional staff will usually ask questions designed to pin 
down the executive branch position as a flat refusal.  The following are 
cross-examination-style questions of the kind typical in oversight 
disputes: 
“Does that mean the Department is refusing the Chairman’s 
request?” 
“Will the Department honor the Chairman’s subpoena?” 
“Is the Administrator aware that it is a crime to be held in contempt 
of Congress?” 
“Is the Administration asserting Executive Privilege?” 
For the executive branch representative, these questions are traps.  
If the answer is “yes” to executive privilege, then the official has 
usurped a presidential prerogative.  If the answer is “no,” it will provide 
Congress with an opportunity to view the dispute as ripe for escalation 
to the next relevant formal step: from document request, to subpoena 
threat, to subpoena issuance, to contempt threat, to contempt hearing, 
and, finally, to contempt vote.  As the holder of the status quo, the 
Executive Branch does not benefit from rapid escalation.  
Correspondence and communication regularly starts from the premise 
of meeting Congress’s legitimate information needs but with 
counterproposals that are acceptable to the Executive. 
From the congressional side, members of Congress are trying to get 
the answers and information they want.  Depending on the 
circumstances, the congressional committee may see benefits in a public 
process fight with the Executive Branch in terms of publicity, interest 
group perception, or political advantage.  Congressional staff members 
tend to frame questions that call for “yes” or “no” answers in cross-
examination style.  That the Executive wants to provide nuance belies 
the divergent views of the branches. 
Given the vast chasm between the branches in the nature of their 
constitutional roles, the salient question then becomes: In the event of 
impasse, how should such issues be resolved?  The next section of the 
Article addresses Congress’s potential remedies to vindicate its 
oversight interests. 
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IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT DISPUTES:  REMEDIAL ANALYSIS 
Professor Caprice Roberts, a remedies and federal courts scholar, 
frequently invokes the maxim that remedies shape substantive rights.240  
Remedies used to resolve interbranch oversight disputes not only favor 
one of the competing models—congressional litigation or executive 
transactional—but also shape branch relations in the constitutional 
scheme.  Therefore, appropriate remedial schemes must be very 
carefully applied so as to create the right incentives and outcomes over 
time.  This section considers a number of formal and informal potential 
congressional oversight enforcement remedies. 
A. Potential Oversight Remedial Schemes 
Congress has a range of potential remedies it can seek to enforce its 
oversight prerogatives.  The first set of remedial schemes to consider is 
contempt, which comes in three varieties: inherent contempt power, 
criminal contempt prosecutions, and civil contempt actions.  Contempt 
is defined as “willful disobedience to or open disrespect of a court, 
judge, or legislative body.”241  The contempt approach is germane in that 
the enforcement effort implicates the substance or process of the 
congressional investigation itself.242  In the early days of the Republic, 
the Supreme Court recognized contempt power as necessary to shield 
Congress from being “exposed to every indignity and interruption that 
rudeness, caprice, or even conspiracy, may mediate against it.”243 
The second set of remedial schemes available to Congress is use of 
its other constitutional and functional powers to vindicate its oversight 
interests.  Congress may use legislative authorizations and 
appropriations as leverage against the Executive Branch to obtain 
requested information.  The Senate may use its advice and consent 
power to hold up executive nominations to departments or agencies that 
are resisting congressional oversight requests.  Ultimately, Congress 
could invoke its impeachment power to enforce its oversight 
prerogatives.  Such congressional self-help remedies have the benefit of 
being within the control of Congress itself.  However, such actions have 
 
240.  Caprice L. Roberts, Teaching Remedies from Theory to Practice, 57 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 713, 722 (2013). 
241.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 269 (11th ed. 2011). 
242.  As will be seen below, some other potential remedial schemes are non-germane.  
See infra Part IV. 
243.  Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 228 (1821). 
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a weaker nexus to the oversight process in dispute, and that lack of 
germaneness tends to increase the political costs to Congress because 
other policy priorities are obstructed in the name of a congressional 
investigation. 
Contempt and congressional self-help remedies serve valid purposes; 
however, there is a critical, and often overlooked, distinction between 
congressional oversight activities directed at the Executive and activities 
directed at private parties.244  Though inherent and criminal contempt 
may be appropriate for recalcitrant private parties, the nature of 
separation of powers suggests that contempt and self-help remedies be 
used to address interbranch disputes.  The following sections analyze the 
appropriateness of contempt and self-help remedies in such disputes. 
1. Contempt 
One method by which Congress can regulate its own proceedings is 
through the use of its contempt power.  Contempt comes in three forms:  
inherent, criminal, and civil.  One important distinction between the 
various types to keep in mind is the level of participation required by 
other branches for Congress to exercise its contempt power.  
a. Inherent Contempt 
Inherent contempt only requires action on the part of Congress 
itself.245  Under this approach, Congress directs the Sergeant-at-Arms to 
bring a person before the Senate or House for trial.246  If convicted, 
Congress can impose a prison sentence for coercive247 or punitive248 
purposes.  A person imprisoned by Congress may still avail herself of a 
writ of habeas corpus to challenge the validity of the detention in 
court.249 
As late as 1977, one court noted that inherent contempt power has 
the benefit of avoiding the type of dilemma Congress faces when 
 
244.  There are other entities that could fall within the oversight gaze, including state 
and local governments, the judiciary, or international organizations subsidized by the United 
States. 
245.  See ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 15 (“Unlike criminal and civil contempt 
proceedings, Congress’ inherent contempt power may be used without the cooperation or 
assistance of either the executive or judicial branches.”). 
246.  Id. at 14. 
247.  See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 162 (1927). 
248.  See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 147–48 (1935). 
249.  28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). 
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seeking executive participation in prosecuting executive branch 
officials.250  Inherent contempt allows Congress to retain control of the 
entire enforcement process.251 
The House of Representatives . . . retains its inherent power to 
enforce its own subpoena duces tecum against any resistance or 
reluctance to comply with it, by means of civil contempt 
proceedings and remedies within its own forum.  Such a 
procedure might relieve the judiciary from any further 
involvement in this matter.  That procedure might also avoid 
potential conflicts between the legislative and executive 
branches, and within the executive branch itself, that would 
result from a prosecution by the executive branch, of an 
executive branch official, for conduct in accordance with 
executive branch policy which the House of Representatives 
might deem contempt of its legislative prerogative and 
authority.252 
While the D.C. District Court does a nice job of articulating 
congressional–executive awkwardness presented by the use of criminal 
contempt in an interbranch dispute,253 it fails to recognize the specter of 
interbranch violence.   
To say the least, it would be impractical and unwise for 
congressional security forces to attempt to detain executive branch 
officials and haul them off to the congressional brig,254 although 
commentators occasionally call for it.255  One can see the momentary 
attraction to inherent contempt from the vantage point of a frustrated 
congressional stakeholder who, in the face of perceived non-compliance 
with legitimate congressional requests, encounters an Executive Branch 
 
250.  In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 
1977). 
251.  Id. 
252.  Id. 
253.  See, e.g., Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1962).  
254.  See Adam Cohen, Op-Ed., Congress Has a Way of Making Witnesses Speak: Its 
Own Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A34 (discussing the Capitol Jail facility). 
255.  See Jon Ponder, Jail Cells in U.S. Capitol Building Could be Reopened for Rove, 
Miers and Bolten, PENSITO REV. (July 26, 2007), http://www.pensitoreview.com/2007/07/26/jai
l-cells-in-us-capitol-building-available-for-rove-miers/, archived at http://perma.cc/W5JE-
EBGP (“Perhaps it is time for Congress to dust off its rusty inherent contempt power, reopen 
the Capitol hoosegow, get some of the Capitol Police’s finest, and put a couple of people 
behind bars for a few days.” (quoting congressional scholar Norm Ornstein) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
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that refuses to prosecute its own under the congressional contempt 
statute, and federal courts that resist judicial enforcement.   
However, as a practical matter, it is hard to imagine the Executive 
Branch standing idly by as congressional security forces seek forcible 
detention of a cabinet official.  The Executive Branch has more guns.  It 
would be incredibly damaging to the constitutional scheme if we 
incentivized even the specter of violence between the political branches.  
But inherent contempt would require that we jump to such vulgar 
considerations almost immediately.  Any constitutional avoidance 
doctrine that contemplates police power that is divided by branch, at 
cross-purposes, is therefore of little value. 
Such considerations likely led the court in Miers to suggest that the 
congressional arrest of a senior presidential advisor would be 
particularly inappropriate.256  In contrast, while it has fallen out of 
Congress’s favor,257 use of inherent contempt procedure against a 
private party raises no such concerns because the federal government’s 
monopoly—and unity—of police power is not threatened.  
b.  Criminal Contempt 
Criminal contempt actions require the participation of all three 
branches of government.  Under this approach, Congress formally finds 
an individual in contempt of Congress.  Then, Congress refers the 
person to the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia for criminal 
prosecution under the criminal contempt statute.258  At that point, the 
resulting proceeding takes on the character of any criminal prosecution 
conducted in Article III courts. 
While this is a perfectly workable regime when the individual held in 
contempt is a non-federal party, it is problematic as applied to 
interbranch oversight disputes.  Congress believes that the criminal 
contempt remedy is wholly applicable in this context.  In fact, since 
Watergate, a component of Congress259 has cited thirteen senior 
executive branch officials for contempt under a threat of criminal 
 
256.  See Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 92 (D.D.C. 2008). 
257.  See S. REP. NO. 95-170, at 97 (1977) (describing Congress’s inherent contempt 
remedy as “time consuming and not very effective”). 
258.  2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012) (imposing a “duty” on the U.S. Attorney to “bring the 
matter before the grand jury for its action”). 
259.  “Component” means a subcommittee, full committee, or an entire chamber.  
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sanction.260  Accordingly, Congress expects the U.S. Attorney for the 
District of Columbia to initiate prosecutions against other executive 
branch officials held in contempt even though that prosecutor is a 
subordinate of the President and even when the President asserted 
executive privilege.261 
Nevertheless, the Executive will not prosecute an executive branch 
official acting pursuant to an assertion of executive privilege.262  The 
Department of Justice, which has taken this position since at least 
1956,263 has two principal reasons.  First, according to the Department, 
the executive branch official has not committed a crime if acting 
pursuant to the assertion of privilege.264  Second, Congress may not 
command an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which is an executive 
branch function.265  In line with this position, the Department of Justice 
declined to prosecute executive branch officials subject to privilege 
assertions who were held in contempt findings under President George 
 
260.  The officials are Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1975); Secretary of Commerce 
Rogers C.B. Morton (1975); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph A. Califano, 
Jr. (1978); Secretary of Energy Charles Duncan (1980); Secretary of Energy James B. 
Edwards (1981); Secretary of the Interior James Watt (1982); Environmental Protection 
Agency Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford (1983); Attorney General William French 
Smith (1983); White House Counsel John M. Quinn (1996); Attorney General Janet Reno 
(1998); White House Counsel Harriet Miers (2008); White House Chief of Staff Joshua 
Bolten (2008); and Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr. (2012).  KAISER ET AL., supra note 
49, at 34 n.57 (noting the first twelve contempt citations).  The Holder civil litigation is 
parallel to a criminal contempt referral, and Attorney General Holder was the thirteenth 
executive branch official cited for congressional contempt. 
261.  See, e.g., Letter from Kerry W. Kircher, Gen. Counsel, U.S. House of 
Representatives, to Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Att’y for the District of Columbia (July 26, 
2012) (questioning whether Mr. Machen will “proceed as required by Section 194” to bring 
Attorney General Holder’s contempt of Congress before the grand jury).  
262.  See, e.g., Prosecution for Contempt of Cong. of an Exec. Branch Official Who Has 
Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 140 (1984). 
263.  See Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies: Hearings 
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 84th Cong. 2933 (1956) (in 
which Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers testified that where a President asserted 
privilege, the contempt of Congress statute was “inapplicable to the executive departments”). 
264.  See Prosecution for Contempt, 8 Op. O.L.C. at 140. 
265.  For a fulsome academic treatment that leads to the Department’s position, see 
Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 563 (1991) (arguing that Congress cannot mandate prosecutions and that 
criminal contempt prosecutions of executive branch officials would unconstitutionally impede 
executive branch functions). 
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W. Bush266 and President Barack Obama.267  Due to this legal impasse, 
which is another expression of the incompatible oversight models, 
criminal contempt is not a means by which Congress can vindicate its 
oversight interests vis-à-vis the Executive Branch.268 
c.  Civil Contempt 
Civil contempt actions require the participation of two branches of 
the federal government: Congress and the judiciary.  In light of 
problems applying inherent and criminal contempt to interbranch 
disputes, over the last decade Congress has turned to civil contempt 
procedures in an effort to obtain judicial enforcement of its subpoenas 
against the Executive.  
The Senate and House have separate civil contempt procedures.  
The Senate has a statute conferring authority on the federal courts to 
issue an order commanding a person to comply with a Senate 
subpoena.269  The procedure thereby allows the Senate to hold persons 
in contempt, utilizing Article III court proceedings as the means of 
enforcement.  Since 1979, the Senate has authorized Senate Legal 
Counsel to seek judicial enforcement of a document subpoena six times, 
none of which have been directed against executive branch officials.270 
In the House, civil contempt must be authorized by a resolution 
formalizing a contempt citation and authorizing a congressional 
component or House General Counsel to initiate civil litigation.271  The 
civil actions involving Joshua Bolten and Harriet Miers (Miers)272 and 
Eric Holder (Holder)273 are the only examples of civil enforcement by 
the House.  Given the effectiveness of inherent and criminal contempt 
 
266.  See Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. 
House of Representatives (Feb. 29, 2008) (explaining the Department’s refusal to prosecute 
White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten and former White House Counsel Harriet Miers). 
267.  See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen, to John A. Boehner, Speaker, 
U.S. House of Representatives (June 28, 2012) (explaining the Department’s refusal to 
prosecute Attorney General Eric Holder). 
268.  In light of this reality, two commentators argue for court-appointed special 
prosecutors anytime Congress holds an executive branch official in contempt.  See Stanley M. 
Brand & Sean Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly 
Means by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch 
Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986). 
269.  See 2 U.S.C. § 288d (2012). 
270.  KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 34. 
271.  See id. at 34–35. 
272.  Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). 
273.  Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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remedies against non-federal oversight targets, it is not surprising that to 
date the House has sought civil contempt remedies only against 
executive branch officials.  
As will be discussed in Part V, the Executive continues to vigorously 
contest the justiciability of civil contempt actions brought against 
executive branch officials who are resisting congressional oversight 
pursuant to a presidential assertion of executive privilege. 
2. Congressional Self-Help Remedies 
In addition to its contempt power, Congress has numerous formal 
and informal self-help remedies at its disposal.  Congress may use its 
legislative authorization power as leverage against executive officials or 
agencies to obtain oversight materials.  It may similarly employ its 
control over the nation’s purse against resistant executive branch 
entities.  Further, the Senate can threaten to hold up executive 
nominees with its advice and consent power or try impeachments 
approved by the House.  Finally, Congress can use the media to push its 
own agenda by placing unwanted attention on the Executive Branch.   
a. Legislative Authorizations 
Congress may use legislative authorizations as a means of enforcing 
its oversight prerogatives.  As the Congressional Oversight Manual 
notes, “[t]hrough its authorization power, Congress exercises significant 
control over any government agency.”274  According to a leading expert 
on congressional procedure, the “authorization process is an important 
oversight tool.”275  For example, Congress could eliminate, or threaten 
to eliminate, a position of a recalcitrant witness.  It could assign a 
function to a different agency or end a program of interest to the 
Executive.  Further, Congress could withhold reauthorization for a 
program or other executive branch priority as leverage to obtain 
requested oversight materials.276   
 
274.  KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 17.   
275.  WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY 
PROCESS 297 (6th ed. 2004). 
276.  See KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 18 (“Expiration of an agency’s program 
provides an excellent chance for in-depth oversight . . . .”).  
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b.  Appropriations Power 
Congress views the appropriations process as one of its “most 
important forms of oversight.”277  But in addition to the process itself, it 
can serve as a remedial tool.  Congress has employed the “power of the 
purse” to enforce its oversight interests.278  If an executive branch entity 
is resisting congressional oversight requests, “the appropriations for the 
agency or department involved can be cut off or reduced when 
requested information is not supplied.”279 
c.  Senate Advice and Consent 
The Senate may use its power of advice and consent in the executive 
nominations process as leverage to obtain documents or secure witness 
testimony from the Executive.280  It is a common practice.281  The 
Senate’s leverage may be more pronounced in periods of divided 
 
277.  Id. 
278.  Id. at 4. 
279.  ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 18. 
280.  See id. (noting that “a hold can be placed by a senator on agency nominees until the 
information is released”). 
281.  See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Senator May Block Successor to Defense Policy Chief 
Feith, WASH. POST, June 23, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20
05/06/22/AR2005062201989.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DK5T-ALWW (describing 
efforts by Senator Carl M. Levin to obtain documents related to an investigation as to how 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, “shaped the administration’s view 
of the relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda before the U.S. invaded Iraq”); Pauline 
Jelinek, Graham Says He’ll Block Nominations over Benghazi, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 28, 
2013, 6:03 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/graham-says-hell-block-nominations-over-bengh
azi, archived at http://perma.cc/3DQK-CM3R (discussing Senator Lindsay Graham’s use of 
holds to gain congressional access to all survivors of the September 11–12, 2011, attack on 
U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya); Jason Miller, Sen. Coburn to Put Hold on OPM 
Director Nominee, FED. NEWS RADIO (July. 31, 2013, 1:47 PM), http://www.federalnewsradio
.com/520/3406794/Sen-Coburn-to-put-hold-on-OPM-director-nominee, archived at http://per
ma.cc/JZU2-7DHW (relating Senator Tom Coburn’s willingness to use a hold to procure an 
answer from the White House and Office of Personnel Management about how the 
Affordable Care Act applies to lawmakers and their staff); Brendan Sasso, Grassley to Hold 
up Obama’s Nominees to FCC over LightSquared Documents, THE HILL (Nov. 3, 2011, 5:31 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/191639-grassley-to-hold-up-fcc-nomin
ees-over-lightsquared-documents, archived at http://perma.cc/PDR9-7KH2 (reporting Senator 
Chuck Grassley’s use of holds while seeking access related to a satellite-based broadband 
service that allegedly interferes with Global Positioning Systems (GPS)); Jordy Yager, 
Grassley Threatens to Hold up ATF Nominee over Separate Dispute, THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2013, 
9:44 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/280447-grassley-threatens-to-hold-up-atf-nomi
nee-over-separate-dispute, archived at http://perma.cc/STU2-MY6X (discussing Senator 
Grassley’s use of a hold while seeking “access to 1,200 documents” related to a congressional 
investigation of a False Claims Act settlement with the city of St. Paul). 
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government; however, the Senate’s countermajoritarian procedures—
including the practice of “holds” by one member alone282—render it an 
effective method of self-help.  The Senate is often successful at 
obtaining disputed information from the Executive by means of the 
confirmation process.283  This remedy comes at a political cost to 
Congress, however, because it puts Congress in the position of 
obstructing the nominations process where the germaneness to the 
oversight dispute is attenuated.  
d.  Impeachment 
The Constitution also grants Congress power to remove the 
President and certain other executive branch officials by means of 
impeachment.284  It provides: 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.285 
The House of Representatives has the “sole Power of Impeachment.”286  
The Senate has the “sole Power to try all Impeachments” and may 
convict upon a two-thirds vote.287 
 
282.  See Robert F. Turner, Constitutional Implications of Senate “Holds” on Treaties 
and Diplomatic Nominations, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175, 184–85 (2006) (criticizing Senate 
‘hold’ procedures as unconstitutional and noting that they are “sometimes used to pressure 
the President or an executive department to turn over documents”). 
283.  See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S4139–44 (daily ed. June 28, 2011) (Senator Grassley: “I 
also understand that Senator Chambliss has reached an agreement . . . [with the Justice 
Department that] he has sought on behalf of the Intelligence Committee.  Accordingly, I now 
lift my opposition to the Senate holding a vote on [Deputy Attorney General nominee James] 
Cole’s nomination.”); Tony Bertuca, Senator Lifts Hold On Shyu’s Nomination; DOD To 
Audit Russian Helo Deal, INSIDE THE ARMY (Sept. 24, 2012), available at 2012 WLNR 
20303203; Cheryl K. Chumley, EPA Hands Over Documents to Advance McCarthy 
Nomination, HEARTLAND (June 6, 2013), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2013/0
6/06/epa-hands-over-documents-advance-mccarthy-nomination, archived at http://perma.cc/H
N6J-3VJD; Kimberley Dozier, White House to Give Benghazi Documents to Senators, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 22, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/22/whit
e-house-benghazi-documents_n_2744980.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3JAF-YZ2W; Sean 
Reilly, Hold Lifted on Senate Confirmation of OPM Director, FED. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2013, 6:00 
AM), available at http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20130807/PERSONNEL01/308070004/
Hold-lifted-Senate-confirmation-OPM-director, archived at http://perma.cc/F9JB-8VCJ. 
284.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 5; id. § 3, cl. 6. 
285.  Id. art. II, § 4. 
286.  Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
287.  Id. § 3, cl. 6. 
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There is a longstanding debate about whether the phrase “high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors” has substantive content or is merely a 
reflection of the political determination of Congress.288  There is a 
related question as to whether an executive official could be convicted 
by means of impeachment for obstruction of a congressional 
investigation.   
Congress, unsurprisingly, takes the view that oversight disputes may 
serve as the basis for impeachment.289  As a stark example: the third 
Article of Impeachment of President Nixon was predicated on his 
failure to comply with congressional subpoenas issued by the House 
Judiciary Committee.290  Specifically, the Committee alleged that  
Richard M. Nixon, substituting his judgment as to what materials 
were necessary for the inquiry, interposed the powers of the 
Presidency against the lawful subpoenas of the House of 
Representatives, thereby assuming to himself functions and 
judgments necessary to the exercise of the sole power of 
impeachment vested by the Constitution in the House of 
Representatives.291 
 
288.  See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IMPEACHMENT: AN 
OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE 22 (2010) 
(“Thus treason and bribery may be fairly clear as to their meanings, but the remainder of the 
language has been the subject of considerable debate.”); see also Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
169, 169–70 (2000) (discussing Congress as the venue for constitutional interpretation of the 
phrase “high Crimes and Misdemeanors”); Alex Simpson Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. 
PA. L. REV. 651, 676–95 (1916) (arguing there was confusion as to the meaning of the phrase 
“high Crimes and Misdemeanors” at the Constitutional Convention).  For more on 
impeachment, see generally BRIAN C. KALT, CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS (2012); 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE 
SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992); Michael J. Klarman, 
Constitutional Fetishism and the Clinton Impeachment Debate, 85 VA. L. REV. 631 (1999).  
289.  ROSENBERG, supra note 120, at 19 (suggesting that, “in an exceptional case, the 
official might be impeached”). 
290.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 4 (1974). 
291.  Id.  At the time, William Van Alstyne argued that article III of the Nixon 
impeachment represented bootstrapping by Congress because it sought to enforce views of its 
own powers without seeking a court to sustain its views.  See William Van Alstyne, The Third 
Impeachment Article: Congressional Bootstrapping, 60 A.B.A. J. 1199, 1201–02 (1974).  While 
I do not agree that court review is a condition precedent to impeachment, there is a 
bootstrapping problem related to use of contempt or impeachment power as an independent 
basis to justify congressional investigative action. 
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Because President Nixon resigned from office, the House did not vote 
on the resolution.292  Therefore, the obstruction of Congress ground for 
impeachment was not put to further test.  
Impeachment is an extraordinary remedy.  When leveled against an 
executive official, it supplants the President’s removal power.  When 
invoked against a President or Vice President, it overturns an election.  
Impeachment exacts tremendous political costs on Congress and the 
political system overall.  It remains, however, the most powerful tool of 
self-help at Congress’s disposal. 
e.  Political Campaign and Press Narratives 
Informally, Congress may take its case to the public through the 
media and political campaigns.  Political pressure, if sufficient, can be an 
effective motivator for the Executive to relent to congressional 
demands.293  This informal remedy benefits our constitutional scheme.  
Political pressure is often a good barometer for the two most relevant 
factors in an interbranch clash: the level of congressional need and the 
significance of the executive branch interests informing resistance.  As 
noted previously, the 9/11 Commission obtained the President’s 
intelligence briefing materials largely due to the political intensity 
following the catastrophic terrorist attacks on the United States.294  In 
most other contexts—even those implicating potential executive branch 
misconduct—the executive branch interests in confidentiality and 
candor of advice would likely protect similar intelligence products from 
congressional production. 
In practice, both Congress and the Executive seek to shape the 
political environment in which their oversight disputes play out.  
Depending on the nature of the inquiry, Congress can develop 
substantive themes about misconduct, maladministration, and 
corruption in the Executive.295  Congress can also promote procedural 
 
292.  See H.R. Res. 803, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 2349–50 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-
1305 (1974) (House Judiciary Committee report recommending President Nixon’s 
impeachment). 
293.  See PROJECT ON GOV’T OVERSIGHT, supra note 120, at 43 (“It’s newsworthy when 
the executive branch doesn’t comply with the legislative branch’s duty to conduct oversight.  
Attention garnered from news coverage can lead to pressure from the top that shakes down 
the information needed.”). 
294.  See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
295.  See, e.g., Letter from Darrell Issa, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t 
Reform, Jim Jordan, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs, Stimulus Oversight 
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arguments about the executive branch resistance to oversight, including 
charges of delay, irresponsibility, stonewalling, lawlessness, and 
obstruction.296  Again, depending on the credibility and gravity of the 
inquiry, such arguments could eventually flare into an inferno like 
Watergate, but most trundle along as slow-burn partisan controversies 
like Solyndra.297  
For its part, the Executive has a slightly different set of incentives as 
to political narratives.  Depending on the nature of the congressional 
inquiry, the Executive may defend itself on substantive, procedural, or 
ad hominem grounds.  Put another way, the Executive could deny the 
allegations, bemoan congressional investigative tactics, or attack the 
credibility of the particular congressional investigator.  As the 
beneficiary of the status quo, no news is literally good news.  Therefore, 
the fewer press stories and political rhetoric about oversight disputes, 
the better for the Executive.  As a result, much of the Executive’s work 
on political environment shaping takes place behind the scenes.  By 
means of research, documents, and argument, the Executive will often 
seek to dissuade reporters from reporting on stories where it believes 
there is a trumped up or non-credible congressional allegation.  If a 
reporter is determined to write a negative story, the Executive will often 
try to soften the coverage by pointing to mitigating facts.  
Congress has advantages in the political framing of oversight 
disputes because the Executive is in the position of resisting a 
congressional investigative process.  In addition, the media has an 
institutional interest in greater disclosure and therefore tends to tilt 
coverage in favor of Congress.  There is another point that is difficult to 
navigate for the Executive in the political arena: often an important 
executive confidentiality interest has nothing to do with the substance of 
the congressional investigation.  This phenomenon creates tension 
within the Executive and puts agencies resisting oversight in an adverse 
political posture vis-à-vis Congress. 
Imagine that Congress is investigating wrongdoing at an agency and 
writes its document requests in a manner that calls for a large tranche of 
material that does not raise any executive branch hackles but also would 
cover tangential deliberations related to presidential appointments and 
 
& Gov’t Spending, & Trey Gowdly, Chairman, House Subcomm. on Health Care, D.C., 
Census, & the Nat’l Archives, to Steven Chu, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy 4 (Aug. 14, 2014). 
296.  See, e.g., id. 
297.  See, e.g., id. at 1. 
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pending agency adjudications.  Also assume, for a moment, that the 
Executive believes that its conduct is entirely defensible.  The executive 
branch agency head will have an incentive to produce all the requested 
materials in an effort to end the scrutiny, but the Office of Legal 
Counsel and the White House may want the agency to continue 
principled objections to the requests that implicate broader executive 
branch interests.  Thereafter, the agency is left open to charges of 
stonewalling that congressional actors may then promote as evidence 
that the substantive allegations are true.  The Executive as a whole must 
weigh this political cost to the agency with all its various oversight 
interactions across the federal government. 
Neither Congress nor the Executive looks good when they are in 
conflict, and purely political remedies can sometimes be obtained by 
heat rather than light.  However, political pressure is generally good at 
balancing congressional need with executive branch interests.  Further, a 
thoroughly political mechanism is especially appropriate for resolution 
of disputes between the political branches. 
Upon scrutiny, it becomes clear that the vast majority of self-help 
remedial schemes available to Congress in the separation of powers 
context are unavailable in the context of enforcement action against a 
private party.  As such, where private parties frustrate Congress’s 
compulsory processes, criminal contempt reveals itself as the 
appropriate, and often only, formal remedy.   
In contrast, self-help remedies are available to Congress in disputes 
with the Executive.  They also allow political will and leverage to 
resolve inherently political disputes without calling on the judiciary to 
intervene.  Congress, in fact, regularly employs self-help remedies on 
oversight matters.  However, consistent with its litigation perspective, 
the House has initiated civil contempt litigation in the two highest 
profile interbranch matters over the last decade: Miers and Holder.298 
B. Congressional Litigation Perspective on Remedies 
Congress believes its subpoenas should be enforceable against the 
Executive through all three types of contempt.  As noted above, there 
are functional impediments to inherent and criminal contempt remedies 
in interbranch disputes.299  As such, Congress has turned to civil 
 
298.  See Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2013); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). 
299.  See supra Part IV.A.1.a–b. 
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contempt remedies as the primary method for vindicating oversight 
interests resisted at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue.  To 
Congress, such matters are justiciable.  Furthermore, Congress would 
like to see routine judicial enforcement of congressional subpoenas.300   
Congress derives significant political cost savings by means of a 
litigation enforcement model.  While Congress bears some political costs 
for initiating litigation against the Executive, the primary costs are paid 
during the contempt proceeding antecedent to the litigation.  Once it is 
in the courts, Congress externalizes the enforcement costs by 
outsourcing them to the judiciary.  Aside from briefs and the ultimate 
decision, there is little further political capital expended during the 
pendency of the litigation.   
In contrast, self-help remedies require Congress to internalize their 
enforcement costs.  If the Senate holds up an executive nomination over 
a document dispute, the Senators will have to face the ire of interest 
groups and other stakeholders to that nomination.  The same is true 
with analogous uses of authorization or appropriations remedies.  As 
such, even though Congress uses them as a matter of course, self-help 
remedies are not preferable to Congress as an alternative to a judicial 
enforcement mechanism. 
Instead, Congress’s desired result is a definitive ruling from a court, 
with binding precedent, enforcing Congress’s entitlement to executive 
branch information.301  The precedential effect of Congress’s desired 
litigation remedy also would serve as a deterrent to the Executive in 
future information access disputes.  Having adopted a litigation model, 
of course Congress prefers a litigation remedy.   
C. Executive Transactional Perspective on Remedies 
Consistent with its transactional perspective on the nature of 
congressional oversight, the Executive takes the position that 
congressional subpoena enforcement actions are nonjusticiable in 
interbranch disputes.  For example, in Holder, the Executive argued: 
“This case is not a case or controversy under Article III: it is a 
quintessentially political dispute between the Branches over the scope 
 
300.  See generally Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Comm. on 
Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) (No. 12-cv-01332-
ABJ) [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss], ECF No. 17. 
301.  Of course, Congress could have a different perspective in the event of an adverse 
ruling in Holder. 
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of their respective constitutional powers.  The Constitution itself, and 
not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides the mechanism for 
resolving such contests.”302 
Putting aside the strength or weakness of the Department’s political 
question and judicial abstention argument, it is clear that the Executive 
views this type of dispute as inappropriate for, if not incapable of, 
judicial resolution on the merits.  Rather, the Executive believes the 
appropriate remedial scheme for Congress to enforce its prerogatives is 
found in Article I, not Article III.  Again, in Holder, the Executive 
argued: 
The Founders carefully set out the tools by which Congress may 
protect its institutional interests, and they are substantial.  
Among other powers, Congress can withhold funds from the 
Executive Branch, override vetoes, decline to enact legislation, 
refuse to act on nominations, and adjourn.  If Congress is 
dissatisfied with the President’s response to a congressional 
investigation, it is free to employ these or any other means of 
self-help within its constitutional authority to reach a political 
accommodation—but only if it is willing to incur the associated 
political costs.  Cf. The Federalist No. 51 (Madison) (“Ambition 
must be made to counteract ambition.”).  The Executive Branch 
must similarly weigh the harm from congressional incursion into 
its institutional prerogatives against the costs that may flow from 
resistance.  That is how the political Branches have traditionally 
resolved such conflicts.303 
Put another way, Congress should engage in self-help rather than 
seeking judicial enforcement.  To the Executive, political disputes call 
for political remedies.  Negotiation and leverage, not judicial resolution 
creating legal entitlements, is the proper path.  While the Supreme 
Court has not passed on the question, the Executive has lost on the 
justiciability issue in lower courts in both Miers304 and Holder.305 
 
302.  Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 75, at 19. 
303.  Id. at 19–20. 
304.  558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 98 (D.D.C. 2008).   
305.  979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 26 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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V. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN ACTION: 
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM V. HOLDER  
The Supreme Court has never ruled on a constitutional collision 
between Congress and the Executive arising from a congressional 
subpoena frustrated by the President’s assertion of executive privilege.  
In the absence of Supreme Court pronouncements, the political 
branches feel legally unconstrained to adhere to their incompatible 
constitutional perspectives.306  Oversight Committee v. Holder307 squarely 
presents these irreconcilable theories to the courts.  For the reasons set 
forth below, court resolution of this matter should endeavor to preserve 
a healthy level of interbranch tension created by such incongruity.  The 
court should rely heavily on the Executive model—incentivizing 
resolution through accommodation and compromise while safeguarding 
the legitimate functional interests of Congress and the Executive—but 
also needs to reserve a role for the judiciary.  Choosing one of the 
competing models wholesale would be a grave mistake. 
With respect to judicial involvement in interbranch congressional 
oversight disputes, the two political branches are at extreme odds.  The 
Executive continues to argue that such disputes are categorically 
nonjusticiable.  This viewpoint fails to adequately deter the Executive 
from asserting meritless confidentiality arguments.  It also fails to 
recognize the Court’s need to preserve its ability to restore and preserve 
constitutional order in the event of a genuine separation of powers 
crisis.  For its part, Congress’s belief that the courts should enforce 
Article I interests as a pro forma matter is also a bridge too far.  It fails 
to account for Congress’s lack of meaningful discovery regulation, and it 
is too dismissive of legitimate confidentiality interests that inform 
assertions of executive privilege. 
As discussed below, executive privilege is a presidential assertion of 
executive branch confidentiality interests that has constitutional 
dimension.  Holder represents a collision of the two vehicles of the 
political branches’ constitutional prerogatives: congressional subpoenas 
and executive privilege.  
 
306.  See Chad T. Marriott, Comment, A Four-Step Inquiry to Guide Judicial Review of 
Executive Privilege Disputes Between the Political Branches, 87 OR. L. REV. 259, 274 (2008) 
(“Avoiding the issue has left Congress and the President free from constraint in their 
negotiations over the release of information.”). 
307.  979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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A number of principles should guide the courts as they address the 
arguments in Holder.  First, accommodation and compromise between 
the political branches, without judicial involvement, is the healthiest 
outcome for the constitutional structure.  Second, courts have 
jurisdiction to decide such a dispute but should only exercise that 
jurisdiction as a matter of last resort.  Third, when a court accepts 
jurisdiction, its first role should be that of a mediator rather than an 
implement of enforcement.  Fourth, if the mediation approach fails, the 
court will be required to get into the messy business balancing of 
congressional need with executive confidentiality interests.  This should 
be a particularized, rather than categorical, analysis.  It should also 
require congressional requests that are narrowly tailored to Congress’s 
needs so as to minimize executive branch disruption.  Finally, the courts 
need to be more solicitous of executive branch confidentiality interests 
than the lower courts have been over the last twenty-five years.308  There 
are a number of important executive branch functions that would be 
degraded if disclosed to Congress, especially on the basis of untailored 
assertions of need.  Congress requires information from the Executive 
to perform its legislative function, but where such information requests 
conflict with executive branch functions, they need to exact minimal 
necessary burden.  
Holder ripens this discussion.  The litigation has already produced 
important district court precedent finding the dispute justiciable.309  The 
parties’ pending summary judgment motions, absent settlement, call on 
the district court to decide whether the deliberative process privilege 
that serves as a basis of President Obama’s assertion of executive 
privilege will shield withheld documents from production to Congress in 
its investigation of Operation Fast and Furious.  In order to reach that 
decision, the courts will have to navigate both the litigation and 
transactional models of oversight.  
A. Executive Privilege: A Contested Doctrine 
As noted in Part II.C.1 above, litigation platforms for congressional 
oversight disputes are scant.  Further, consistent with this Article’s 
 
308.  See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (refusing to extend the presidential privilege to documents prepared for the Deputy 
Attorney General). 
309.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 26 (concluding that “neither legal nor prudential 
considerations support the dismissal”). 
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proposed course, courts have been loath to insert themselves into 
interbranch discovery disputes.  Legal precedent evaluating presidential 
assertions of executive privilege to date has come in the context of 
criminal investigations and civil litigation involving private parties, 
especially litigation arising under the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA).310  Executive privilege is an assertion of presidential authority 
to withhold information from a judicial or congressional proceeding.311   
No legal doctrine is more emblematic of the vast chasm separating 
the political branches over congressional oversight than assertions of the 
“deliberative process” privilege.  Several factors lead to this impasse.  
The privilege protects the decision-making process of government 
agencies.  It is designed to encourage frank discussions on matters of 
policy within the Executive, protect against premature disclosure of 
policies before they have been adopted, and minimize public confusion 
that might result from disclosure of discarded policy options and 
rationales.312  Whether it can ever shield disclosure of information 
requested by Congress is at the heart of the Holder litigation.313 
While it has a pedigree dating back to the principles of the English 
“crown privilege,”314 most recent legal precedent on the deliberative 
process privilege develops in the context of litigation under FOIA.  
Specifically, Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or 
intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by 
law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.”315  
Courts have construed this language to “exempt those documents [that 
 
310.  See infra Part V.A.1.b. 
311.  Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383, 1383 (1974).  
Executive privilege may be asserted in a criminal matter or in litigation involving private 
parties.  See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Senate Select Comm. on 
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  Thus, it is a 
doctrine that is broader than the executive–congressional conflict that is the subject of this 
Article. 
312.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 366 
(2009). 
313.  979 F. Supp. 2d at 16 n.7.  The court adopted the Oversight Committee’s 
articulation of the question presented: “[C]an the executive properly assert executive 
privilege to shield an agency’s deliberative processes when the records in dispute do not 
reveal advice provided to the President himself or address his core constitutional 
functions?”  Id. 
314.  See Russell L. Weaver & James T.R. Jones, The Deliberative Process Privilege, 54 
MO. L. REV. 279, 283 (1989) (citing, among others, JOHN HUXLEY BUZZARD, RICHARD 
MAY & M. N. HOWARD, PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE § 14-04 (13th ed. 1982)). 
315.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2012). 
 2014] CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 949 
are] . . . normally privileged in the civil discovery context.”316  According 
to the Department of Justice, the deliberative process is the most 
commonly invoked privilege by the Executive in FOIA matters.317  
However, by its own legislative terms, FOIA, and therefore Exemption 
5, is inapplicable to congressional requests.318 
Legal precedent on the deliberative process privilege is unresolved 
as to its applicability in the congressional context.  But even if the 
deliberative process privilege applies to congressional requests, there is 
ample court opinion language to suggest that it is a heavily qualified 
privilege.  
1. Executive Privilege: Background and Legal Precedent 
Information access disputes between Congress and the President 
date back to the Washington Administration.319  Many presidents have 
refused to produce information requested by Congress based on an 
assertion of privilege,320 over time formalizing the Executive’s process 
for assertions of executive privilege.321  However, due in large part to the 
political branches’ competing visions of constitutional interplay,322 the 
doctrine remains highly controversial and unsettled. 
 
316.  NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 149 (1975); see also FTC v. Grolier, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 19, 26 (1983); Martin v. Office of Special Counsel, 819 F.2d 1181, 1184 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987). 
317.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 312, at 366. 
318.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552(d) (2012) (“This section is not authority to withhold information 
from Congress.”). 
319.  See, e.g., Weaver & Jones, supra note 314, at 284 (noting President Washington’s 
assertion of privilege against congressional inquiries into the St. Clair military expedition and 
Jay Treaty negotiations); Devins, supra note 204, at 109 & n.1 (noting that, in the case of the 
Jay Treaty request, President Washington provided the information to the House 
notwithstanding his objections). 
320.  See Cox, supra note 311, at 1395–1405 (outlining the historical episodes of 
presidential refusal to provide requested information to Congress that could be characterized 
as executive privilege).  See generally MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2008). 
321.  See ROSENBERG, supra note 320, at 14–15. 
322.  At least one commentator called the privilege itself a “myth.”  RAOUL BERGER, 
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); see also Raoul Berger, 
Congressional Subpoenas to Executive Officials, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 865, 887 (1975) (“History 
in short, demonstrates that Congress was designed to exercise the inquisitorial power 
exercised by Parliament, that this power was unqualified, that no member of the English 
executive had claimed to be exempt from this power, and that no member of the several 
Conventions had claimed for the President any exemption from this power of the Grand 
Inquest of the Nation.”). 
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The Supreme Court addressed executive privilege in United States v. 
Nixon.323  President Nixon asserted executive privilege in order to deny 
production of documents and tape recordings subpoenaed by the 
Watergate Special Prosecutor.324  That case involved a criminal 
investigation, representing an intrabranch dispute between the President 
and a subordinate prosecutor325 rather than an oversight dispute 
between political branches.  Still, it implicated interbranch friction 
between the Executive and the judiciary.326   
In rejecting the President’s assertion of an absolute privilege, the 
Supreme Court described its duty “to resolve . . . competing interests in 
a manner that preserves the essential functions of each branch.”327  The 
Court recognized the constitutional foundations of executive privilege: 
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore 
alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making 
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to 
express except privately.  These are the considerations justifying 
a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications.  The 
privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and 
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution.328 
Thereafter the Court applied a balancing test, weighing “historic 
commitment to the rule of law” against the President’s interests in 
confidentiality.329   
Nixon specifically declined to opine on the balance between a 
President’s “confidentiality interest and congressional demands for 
information.”330  It is unclear what effect, if any, a shift in context from 
criminal prosecution to congressional proceeding would have on the 
Court’s analysis.  The Court suggested that presidential advisors would 
 
323.  418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
324.  See id. at 688.  
325.  Id. at 692 (noting the President’s argument that the matter was “an intra-branch 
dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the Executive Branch”). 
326.  Id. at 707 (noting the obstruction that an “unqualified privilege would place in the 
way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal 
prosecutions”). 
327.  Id. 
328.  Id. at 708. 
329.  Id. 
330.  Id. at 712 n.19. 
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not “temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of 
disclosure . . . in the context of a criminal prosecution.”331   
Congressional requests for information, by contrast, are legion.  In 
addition, Congress contains a President’s political adversaries, whereas 
the judiciary, while by no means free of its own brand of politics, is 
guided by generally neutral principles.  Furthermore, prosecutors and 
courts do not have access to Congress’s non-judicial remedies to 
vindicate their interests.  These points militate in favor of a stronger 
executive privilege vis-à-vis Congress than the courts. 
On the other hand, the legislative function is critical to the 
constitutional scheme.  Generally, congressional need for information is 
strong, and the Court would likely be well outside its comfort zone 
deciding about the needs of its coordinate branch.  Such arguments 
suggest the Court might favor congressional interests or see the 
criminal–congressional distinction as one without a difference. 
a. Executive Privilege Cases Involving Congressional Subpoenas 
Including Holder, there are only five court cases addressing 
congressional–executive information disputes involving congressional 
subpoenas in conflict with a presidential assertion of executive 
privilege.332  While significant in many respects, Miers, AT&T, and U.S. 
House of Representatives all address jurisdictional and justiciability 
issues, and none reach the merits.333 
Only one case, Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon,334 reaches the merits of a clash between 
congressional oversight needs and executive confidentiality interests.  
There, the Senate had established a select committee to “investigate 
‘illegal, improper or unethical activities’” related to the 1972 presidential 
election.335  The committee subpoenaed President Nixon to obtain tape 
recordings and documents related to alleged criminal activity and 
 
331.  Id. at 712. 
332.  See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Senate 
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 
Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013); Comm. on 
the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); United States v. House of 
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983). 
333.  See Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d at 134; Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 98; House of 
Representatives, 556 F. Supp. at 153. 
334.  498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
335.  Id. at 726 (quoting S. Res. 60, 93d Cong., 119 CONG. REC. 3849 (1973)). 
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government misconduct.336  In response, President Nixon asserted 
executive privilege.337 
The court balanced congressional need with executive 
confidentiality interests in holding that “the sufficiency of the 
Committee’s showing must depend solely on whether the subpoenaed 
evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the 
Committee’s functions.”338  Thereafter, it assessed subsequent, 
overlapping activity by the House Judiciary Committee as a factor 
weakening the Senate committee’s claim.339  The standard it then 
erected for the committee was “whether the subpoenaed materials are 
critical to the performance of its legislative functions.”340   
Senate Select Committee is significant to the competing oversight 
models because it engaged in a searching, interest-balancing exercise 
and an exacting inquiry into congressional need.  As such, even though 
it represents a judicial resolution disfavored by the Executive,341 this 
case reflects an executive sensibility about the nature of interbranch 
conflict.  However, although it does not analytically conflict with 
Nixon’s reasoning, it predates the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on 
executive privilege.  Unlike Holder, the subpoenaed materials 
implicated direct presidential communications.342  It also predates D.C. 
Circuit precedent that has disfavored executive privilege in non-
oversight contexts. 
b. Other Significant Executive Privilege Precedent 
In the period since Watergate, lower courts have been less than 
solicitous of executive privilege, albeit in non-oversight contexts.  While 
there have been a number of decisions evaluating privilege claims, two 
D.C. Circuit cases stand out for purposes of this Article: In re Sealed 
Case (Espy)343 in the criminal context and Judicial Watch, Inc. v. 
 
336.  Id. at 726–27. 
337.  Id. at 727. 
338.  Id. at 731; see also Marshall, supra note 18, at 803–08 (arguing that congressional 
need is often questionable because there are few political costs due to, and negligible process 
constraints on, initiation of an investigation). 
339.  Senate Select Comm., 498 F.2d at 732. 
340.  Id. 
341.  Judge Wilkey argued, in a concurrence, that the “constitutional principle of 
separation of powers ma[de] the issue . . . a political question and therefore not justiciable.”  
Id. at 734 (Wilkey, J., concurring). 
342.  Id. at 726 (majority opinion). 
343.  121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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Department of Justice344 in the FOIA context.  Both cases suggest that 
the D.C. Circuit, which is often the final arbiter in separation of powers 
litigation, is not inclined to accept the transactional model worldview. 
 In Espy, the court held that President Clinton’s assertion of 
executive privilege over eighty-four documents—related to the 1994 
resignation of Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy—could not defeat a 
grand jury subpoena.345  The court discussed the distinction between 
presidential communications and deliberative process rationales for 
assertions of executive privilege.346  According to the court, presidential 
communications privilege has a constitutional basis,347 but deliberative 
process privilege is primarily derived from common law.348  The court 
also noted that deliberative process privilege “disappears altogether 
when there is any reason to believe government misconduct 
occurred.”349  It then declined to apply deliberative process privilege 
analysis because it found that the presidential communications privilege 
is stronger and yet insufficient to defeat production.350   
The reasoning in Espy is particularly troubling to the Executive due 
to its very narrow conception of executive privilege.351  As an initial 
matter, it appeared to confine a constitutional rationale for executive 
privilege to decisions made by the President personally and to cover 
only those people and decisions in his immediate proximity.352  
Therefore, deliberative processes at the departments and agencies are 
likely to receive far less protection.  In addition, the court’s suggestion 
that deliberative process privilege dissolves when there is “any reason to 
believe government misconduct occurred” is very cold comfort when 
transposed from the criminal context to a partisan Congress. 
In the Judicial Watch FOIA litigation, a public interest group sought 
to compel production of materials related to President Clinton’s 
exercise of pardon power.353  The White House is not subject to FOIA, 
but the Act covers records in the Office of the Pardon Attorney at the 
 
344.  365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
345.  Espy, 121 F.3d at 762. 
346.  Id. at 745. 
347.  Id. 
348.  Id. 
349.  Id. at 746. 
350.  Id. at 758. 
351.  Id. at 749, 752. 
352.  Id. at 752. 
353.  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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Department of Justice.354  Holding true to Espy, in Judicial Watch, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected the Department’s argument that the Pardon 
Attorney was a presidential advisor as a functional matter, especially 
with respect to internal Department documents that the Department 
never transmitted to the White House.355  The Executive believes the 
Pardon Attorney supports an exclusive presidential function and does 
not believe the proximity and formalism associated with an institutional 
location should have decided Judicial Watch.  
The D.C. Circuit’s refusal to recognize an evidentiary privilege for 
secret service agents designed to promote presidential safety provides 
further evidence of skepticism of executive confidentiality interests.356  
Based on Cheney, the Supreme Court may be a more hospitable venue 
to executive arguments, but the consequences of an adverse ruling by 
the highest Court should give executive branch litigants pause. 
2. Congress: Executive Privilege Is Narrow and Heavily Qualified 
Consistent with its procedural litigation view, according to Congress, 
executive privilege may only be validly asserted on presidential 
communications privilege.  Congress believes that the presidential 
communications privilege is the only constitutionally based privilege 
rationale.  Congress further believes that even that privilege is heavily 
qualified and should regularly yield to congressional need.  It views most 
assertions of executive privilege as frivolous.357  Further, after serving as 
Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox argued:  
Ideally, I think, the legislative right should prevail in every case 
in which either the Senate or House of Representatives votes to 
override the Executive’s objections, provided that the 
information is relevant to a matter which is under inquiry and 
 
354.  Id. at 1119. 
355.  Id.; see Marriott, supra note 306, at 285–86 (noting that the Judicial Watch decision 
turned more on organizational structure than functional role). 
356.  See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Rubin v. United 
States, 525 U.S. 990 (1998). 
357.  See, e.g., The History of Congressional Access to Deliberative Justice Department 
Documents, Hearing Before the House Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. (2002) (report 
by Charles Tiefer on Executive Privilege Overclaiming at the Justice Department).  Before his 
move to academia, Professor Tiefer served as Solicitor and Deputy General Counsel of the 
U.S. House of Representatives. 
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within the jurisdiction of the body issuing the subpoena, 
including its constitutional jurisdiction.358 
In other words, Cox argues the courts should routinely enforce 
congressional prerogatives even in the face of an assertion of executive 
privilege. 
Congress takes an especially dim view of the deliberative process 
component of executive privilege doctrine, which it views as wholly 
inapplicable to congressional oversight of the Executive.  In the Fast and 
Furious investigation, Chairman Issa cites In re Sealed Case (Espy)359 for 
the proposition that the documents in dispute 
are at best deliberative documents between and among 
Department [of Justice] personnel who lack the requisite 
“operational proximity” to the President.  As such, they cannot 
be withheld pursuant to the constitutionally-based executive 
privilege. . . .  Both, the Espy court observed, are executive 
privileges designed to protect the confidentiality of Executive 
Branch decision-making.  The deliberative-process privilege, 
however, which applies to executive branch officials generally, is 
a common law privilege that requires a lower threshold of need 
to be overcome, and “disappears altogether when there is any 
reason to believe government misconduct has occurred.”360 
Chairman Issa’s argument is consistent with the view expressed in the 
Congressional Oversight Manual published by the Congressional 
Research Service361 and is a centerpiece of the House’s summary 
judgment brief in Holder.362 
 
358.  Cox, supra note 311, at 1434. 
359.  121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
360.  Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting ROSENBERG, 
supra note 320, at 17–18 (quoting Espy, 121 F.3d at 746)).  Espy dealt with a grand jury 
subpoena in a criminal investigation and not a congressional subpoena.  Espy, 121 F.3d at 
735–36.  One can debate whether that distinction is material in a separation of powers 
dispute.  Moreover, the Espy court did not reach the question of whether the documents at 
issue were subject to the deliberative process privilege.  Id. at 758. 
361.  KAISER ET AL., supra note 49, at 45–46 (characterizing deliberative process 
privilege as a “common law privilege . . . that is easily overcome by a showing of need by an 
investigatory body” and noting that “congressional practice has been to treat . . . acceptance 
[of deliberative process privilege] as discretionary with the committee”). 
362.  Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 25–33, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, No. 12-cv-
01332-ABJ (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Mem. of P.&A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for 
Summ. J.], ECF No. 61 (making the argument under the heading “Deliberative Process Does 
Not Excuse the Attorney General’s Non-Compliance Because the Privilege Does Not Apply 
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Aside from the question of whether the doctrine is applicable to 
congressional requests, Congress also views executive branch 
deliberative information as highly probative to its legislative inquiries.  
As Chairman Goss argued, 
It is exactly the “uncoordinated,” “deliberative,” “internal,” and 
“pre-decisional” documents of an agency that Congress needs in 
most cases.  These documents can provide unique insight into the 
full spectrum of thought on any given issue pending before an 
agency and Congress.  Without access to such documents, 
Congress would be left only with the “spin” the executive branch 
agency opted to provide to the legislative branch.  This result, 
without question, would only serve to undermine the legitimate 
authority of Congress to conduct independent oversight.  
Therefore, I would expect the committee to reject all efforts to 
extend the FOIA Exemption 5 to congressional requests for 
information.363 
Chairman Goss articulates an important element of Congress’s 
perspective on the trenchant interbranch conflict related to deliberative 
process privilege.  First, he suggests that access to executive branch 
deliberations, at least as to policy formulation, would help inform the 
congressional legislative process.364  Such legislative deliberation is the 
touchstone of congressional oversight authority. 
In addition, Chairman Goss suggests that failure to provide Congress 
with such materials would significantly hamper the congressional 
oversight function itself because it would only receive access to post-
decisional information.365  His concern contemplates a significant and 
legitimate concern about an unlimited deliberative process privilege.  It 
would simply shield too much information and would have no internal 
limitations beyond the character of information as predecisional and 
related to policy formulation.  Such concerns are especially valid in the 
context of an investigation into executive branch wrongdoing rather 
than a policy formulation inquiry.  To accept categorical application of 
deliberative process privilege as a bar to congressional requests would 
be a principle struggling to find cognizable limits. 
 
to Congressional Subpoenas”). 
363.  H.R. REP. NO. 106-130, pt. 1, at 40 (1999). 
364.  Id. 
365.  Id. 
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Ironically, congressional deliberations are not available to the other 
branches or the public without the express consent of Congress as a 
result of the Speech or Debate Clause.366  As with the Executive, 
Congress desires to protect against the chilling of open and honest 
deliberations that would accompany exposing representatives’ 
statements to the public.  Information protected under the Speech or 
Debate Clause is that of legitimate “legislative acts,”367 and a reviewing 
court must interpret that protection broadly to protect the free 
expression of ideas among legislators who would otherwise fear political 
backlash in raising concerns.368  This broad interpretation ensures the 
independent operation of Congress.369  Accordingly, Congress clearly 
appreciates the values undergirding a deliberative process privilege and 
other similar confidentiality interests, but it does not think such 
assertions have merit when made by the Executive in the context of 
congressional oversight requests. 
3. Executive: Privilege Has Many Viable Oversight Components 
In contrast with Congress’s view of the limited role executive 
privilege plays relating to oversight requests, the Executive believes that 
the term “executive privilege” refers to a bundle of components, all of 
which may be validly asserted against congressional requests.  These 
 
366.  U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [the 
Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”); see also 
CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON’S MANUAL, AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 405–07 (2011) (“Response to Subpoenas . . . Under no 
circumstances may minutes or transcripts of executive sessions, or evidence of witnesses in 
respect thereto, be disclosed or copied.”). 
367.  In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), the Supreme Court defined 
legislative acts as those that are “an integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to 
the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other 
matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.”  408 U.S. 
at 625 
368.  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (establishing that the 
Speech or Debate Clause is to be “read broadly to effectuate its purposes”); Coffin v. Coffin, 
4 Mass. (3 Tyng) 1, 27 (1808) (expanding upon appropriate legislative acts protected by a 
similar clause in a state constitution) (“I therefore think that the article ought not to be 
construed strictly, but liberally, that the full design of it may be answered.  I will not confine it 
to delivering an opinion, uttering a speech, or haranguing in debate; but will extend it to the 
giving of a vote, to the making of a written report, and to every other act resulting from the 
nature, and in the execution, of the office . . . .”). 
369.  Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501–02 (1975) (relying on the 
reasoning of Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881), and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 
367 (1951)). 
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components cover a number of different types of executive branch 
confidentiality interests,370 including the deliberative process privilege 
that is front and center in Holder.371 
The Executive has substantive interests in the applicability of the 
deliberative process component of executive privilege in congressional 
oversight matters.  First, the Executive has long maintained the need for 
its officials to be able to contribute to policy formulation and other 
decisions without undue fear of retribution.  As the Supreme Court 
noted in United States v. Nixon, “[h]uman experience teaches that those 
who expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper 
candor with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process.”372  An expectation of routine 
disclosure of deliberative material to congressional actors would 
significantly chill the candor necessary to provide the best possible range 
of options available to executive branch decision makers.373 
The Executive seeks to distinguish and confine Espy and Judicial 
Watch in the congressional context.  First, as it argues in Holder, the 
Executive believes deliberative process privilege takes on a 
constitutional character when formally asserted vis-à-vis Congress.374  
The D.C. Circuit noted that the “deliberative process privilege is 
 
370.  See, e.g., Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Commc’ns Regarding EPA’s Ozone Air 
Quality Standards and Cal.’s Greenhouse Gas Waiver Request, 32 Op. Att’y Gen., slip op. at 
3 (June 19, 2008) (discussing “presidential communications and deliberative process 
‘components’ of executive privilege”). 
371.  See Assertion of Exec. Privilege over Documents Generated in Response to Cong. 
Investigation into Operation Fast and Furious, 36 Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 2 (June 19, 2012) 
(Opinion of Attorney General Eric Holder). 
372.  418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974); see also Assertion of Executive Privilege with Respect to 
Prosecutorial Documents, 25 Op. Att’y Gen., slip op. at 2 (Dec. 10, 2001) (“If these 
deliberative documents are subject to congressional scrutiny, we will face the grave danger 
that prosecutors will be chilled from providing the candid and independent analysis essential 
to the sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion and to the fairness and integrity of federal 
law enforcement.”).  
373.  As noted in the preceding section, while Congress believes deliberative process 
rationale must yield to congressional oversight interests, it recognizes the value of the 
rationale when shielding its own deliberative material from disclosure in the context of the 
Speech and Debate Clause. 
374.  See Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 20–22, Comm. on Oversight & 
Gov’t Reform v. Holder, No. 12-cv-01332-ABJ (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Mem. in 
Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Motion for Summ. J.], ECF No. 64. 
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primarily a common law privilege.”375  Moreover, both Espy and Judicial 
Watch require a comparison of congressional needs to executive 
grounds.376  Finally, while the Executive respects the authority of lower 
courts, it will likely maintain its views in the absence of a Supreme Court 
ruling foreclosing them.377 
B. A Recommended Approach to Holder 
In Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia,378 the 
Supreme Court observed that the “‘occasion[s] for constitutional 
confrontation between the two branches’ should be avoided whenever 
possible.”379  However, it acknowledged: “Once executive privilege is 
asserted, coequal branches of the Government are set on a collision 
course.”380  Holder is a three-branch collision.   
This section offers an approach to the Holder litigation designed to 
preserve important ambiguities and tension in the scheme of separation 
of powers.  Both branches will have to give ground.  The Executive is 
wrong to adopt a categorical view on justiciability, and Congress is 
wrong to adopt a categorical view on the merits.  The proper result 
requires nuance, particularity, and restraint.  So far, Judge Amy Berman 
Jackson appears to be following such a path.381 
1. Justiciability 
Due to the nature of our constitutional structure, it is preferable to 
have interbranch constitutional conflicts resolved by a process of 
accommodation and compromise.  As one district court noted, the 
stakes in such confrontations are always high: 
There is a sense in which the powers and operations of the 
coequal, but interdependent, branches of the federal government 
 
375.  In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) 
(citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 n. 35 (1982)). 
376.  See Espy, 121 F.3d at 754–55 (assessing investigative need against the presumptive 
privilege); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Justice, 365 F.3d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(same). 
377.  This fact can actually motivate the Executive Branch to settle or absorb an adverse 
lower court ruling to avoid a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court. 
378.  542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
379.  Id. at 389–90 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 
692 (1974)). 
380.  Id. at 389. 
381.  Judge Jackson wrote the order in Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). 
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are constitutionally established over theoretical fault lines.  
Disputes and confrontations between those branches always 
present the kinds of stress and tension that threaten to separate 
and divide those lines into chasms, ultimately collapsing our 
constitutionally created form of government.  Hence, to avert 
and minimize such tensions is always the proper and prudent 
course of action.382 
Goldwater v. Carter383 also provides some instructive language, albeit 
in a different context.  There, several members of Congress filed suit 
alleging that President Carter’s termination of a treaty with Taiwan 
deprived them of their constitutional legislative role.384  Justice Powell 
filed a concurrence in which he argued that the complaint should have 
been dismissed as unripe for judicial review: 
Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between 
Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review unless 
and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional 
authority.  Differences between the President and the Congress 
are commonplace under our system.  The differences should, and 
almost invariably do, turn on political rather than legal 
considerations.  The Judicial Branch should not decide issues 
affecting the allocation of power between the President and 
Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional 
impasse.  Otherwise, we would encourage small groups or even 
individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of 
issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to 
resolve the conflict.385 
Justice Powell suggests that political remedies should be exhausted 
before the courts step in to resolve disputes between the other two 
branches.  His reasoning in that context has salience for congressional 
oversight conflict as well.  
From one perspective, a case like Holder does involve political 
processes—congressional contempt and executive privilege—suggestive 
of a ripened constitutional conflict.  On the other hand, the civil remedy 
Congress prefers bypasses its inherently political remedies like 
appropriations and Senate advice and consent.  In that sense, there is a 
 
382.  In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F. Supp. 1299, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 
1977). 
383.  Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). 
384.  Id. at 997–98 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
385.  Id. at 997. 
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question under Powell’s reasoning as to whether Congress has 
exhaustively taken action asserting its constitutional authority.  Unlike 
Goldwater, which involved only a sub-cameral group of plaintiffs, 
Holder involves action by the entire House of Representatives.386  In this 
way, judicial action is more appropriate in Holder than in Goldwater.   
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.387 reflects a 
transactional sensibility in relation to congressional oversight disputes 
that is backstopped by judicial review.  In seeking to avoid assumption 
of jurisdiction over the interbranch dispute, the D.C. Circuit described 
the branches as having areas of blended power.388  Under such a view of 
the constitutional framework, the separation of powers at the margins is 
indeterminate by design,389 and as such, the branches need to work out 
their respective scopes of authority on a case-by-case basis.  The Court 
observed: 
The framers, rather than attempting to define and allocate all 
governmental power in minute detail, relied, we believe, on the 
expectation that where conflicts in scope of authority arose 
between the coordinate branches, a spirit of dynamic 
compromise would promote resolution of the dispute in the 
manner most likely to result in efficient and effective functioning 
of our governmental system.  Under this view, the coordinate 
branches . . . should take cognizance of an implicit constitutional 
mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic 
evaluation of the needs of the conflicting branches in the 
particular fact situation.390 
Though the court strongly encouraged the political branches to resolve 
disputes on their own, it still acknowledged the justiciablility of the case.  
The court held that the political question doctrine would not bar judicial 
review, noting that the “simple fact of a conflict between the legislative 
 
386.  Id. at 997–98. 
387.  567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).   
388.  Id. at 128. 
389.  Such a view is evocative of Justice Jackson’s famous concurrence in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, in which he recognized a “zone of twilight” occupying the 
uncertain territory where Congress and the President share authority or the branch with 
superior authority is ambiguous.  343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
390.  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d at 127 (footnote omitted). 
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and executive branches over a congressional subpoena does not 
preclude judicial resolution.”391 
Furthermore, the AT&T court’s view seems attuned to the 
Heisenberg Principle problem that counsels court reticence to interfere 
in such disputes between the political branches, but in a manner that still 
reserves the right to involve itself in cases of extraordinary 
constitutional strain.  Another court within the D.C. Circuit echoed the 
importance of judicial avoidance under these circumstances: “When 
constitutional disputes arise concerning the respective powers of the 
Legislative and Executive Branches, judicial intervention should be 
delayed until all possibilities for settlement have been exhausted.”392  As 
these two opinions demonstrate, the few cases that present a concrete 
interbranch oversight dispute tend to take place within the D.C. Circuit, 
which has generally demonstrated sensitivity to the separation of 
powers.393  
Political question doctrine services the policy need to let political 
branches sort out political fights.  However, it does so in a way that says 
“never,” and interbranch disputes about oversight really call for a 
doctrine of severe avoidance—one that says “very rarely”—rather than 
a doctrine of absolute jurisdictional limitation.  As Professor Peter 
Shane argued in the wake of the Gorsuch controversy, 
When an impasse is so great that no such strategy is workable, 
that impasse may signal an occasion for the laws of executive 
privilege to be recrystallized.  Then, and only then, should it be 
necessary for a court to step in and substitute a unitary judicial 
understanding for the contending positions of the political 
branches.394 
This approach is wise because it respects the role of other branches in 
delimiting their own constitutional functions and allows for each to 
energetically pursue the exercise, or protection, of those functions. 
 
391.  Id. at 126–27 (citing Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. 
Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). 
392.  United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152 (D.D.C. 1983). 
393.  See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for 
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002) (noting a “special role the 
D.C. Circuit plays in upholding the rule of law by enforcing legal constraints on the behavior 
of the President” but also “the court’s recognition of the importance of preserving the 
freedom and flexibility that the President needs to do his job”). 
394.  Shane, supra note 35, at 542. 
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It is also certainly worthy to note that the Executive lost the 
justiciability argument in Miers395 and again in Holder.396  In fact, the 
district court in Holder was quite dismissive of the Executive Branch’s 
arguments that the court did not have the power to decide the case.397 
2. Merits 
Each of the parties in Holder calls on the courts to adopt its own 
constitutional vision to the exclusion of the other.  However, if the court 
adopts the AT&T court’s sensible approach, then accommodation and 
compromise becomes the touchstone in disputes between Congress and 
the Executive.398  Each side raises legitimate concerns about wholesale 
adoption of the opposing branch position. 
Congress remains concerned that, in the absence of accessible 
judicial enforcement, the Executive will act with impunity.399  As a 
result, Congress worries that significant waste, fraud, and abuse will go 
undetected and that legislative judgments by Congress will be adversely 
affected.400  Of course, executive branch intransigence is not an 
unjustified concern.  Executive agencies need a distant threat of judicial 
resolution; otherwise there is no incentive for those agencies to give 
effect to executive policy statements recognizing the need to honor 
congressional oversight interests. 
The Executive remains steadfast in its concern about the damaging 
effects, wrought by politicized oversight, on internal deliberative 
processes.  This is not, by any measure, an unjustified concern.401  
Congress has repeatedly elevated obscure public officials to the klieg 
lights of national scrutiny for alleged wrongdoing or as symbols of a 
disfavored policy choice.  While there are certainly acts worthy of 
scrutiny and policies worthy of debate, the partisan nature of 
 
395.  Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 98 (D.D.C. 2008). 
396.  Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 
2013). 
397.  Id. 
398.  See, e.g., Yaron Z. Reich, Comment, United States v. AT&T: Judicially Supervised 
Negotiation and Political Questions, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 466, 467 (1977) (articulating 
justifications for, and advantages of, negotiated or judicially imposed settlements of 
interbranch oversight disputes). 
399.  See Marshall, supra note 18, at 798–800 (arguing that there are strong policy 
justifications for congressional oversight as a check on executive power). 
400.  See id. at 799. 
401.  See id. at 813–14 (describing costs of chilled deliberations resulting from 
congressional investigations). 
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congressional oversight proceedings, coupled with frequent assertions of 
unsubstantiated allegations as established facts and abusive treatment of 
witnesses, threatens to chill legitimate executive branch conduct and 
deliberations. 
Moreover, not all deliberative processes are created equal.  It is 
important to protect all sorts of executive branch deliberations, 
including policy formulation, personnel action, adjudicative 
proceedings, litigation positions, prosecutorial decisions, contract 
awards, pardon decisions, presidential appointments, presidential 
communications, and onward.  However, because many of these 
deliberations must yield to congressional oversight interests, especially 
after a policy is enacted, the need for deliberative space is attenuated.402  
Some, though, like pardon decisions, have independent constitutional 
significance as core presidential functions.  Still others take on 
constitutional significance due to the facts of the particular deliberation 
coupled with a determination by the President that they are worthy of 
the imprimatur of executive privilege. 
Of particular note, some congressional requests seek deliberative 
information that would undermine the separation in separation of 
powers.  For example, Chairman Issa’s letter responding to President 
Obama’s assertion of executive privilege concluded with a request that 
the White House “identify any communications, meetings, and 
teleconferences between the White House and the Justice Department 
between February 4, 2011,” the date the Justice Department first 
responded to a congressional inquiry, “and June 18, 2012, the day before 
. . . [the assertion of] privilege.”403  Chairman Issa, in effect, asked the 
President to disclose to Congress all of the executive branch 
deliberations about how to respond to a ranging and partisan 
congressional investigation.  In fact, it is this very tactic on the part of 
the Oversight Committee—seeking to peer into the internal executive 
branch responses to Oversight Committee stimuli—that serves as the 
basis for much of President Obama’s assertion of privilege.404 
 
402.  Order at 2, Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform Holder, No. 12-cv-01332-ABJ 
(D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2014), ECF No. 81 (order denying both parties’ motions for summary 
judgment) (“[T]here are two essential requirements for application of the deliberative process 
privilege: the material covered by the privilege must be predecisional, and it must be 
deliberative.” (citing In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1997))). 
403.  Comm. Letter to President Obama, supra note 12, at 7. 
404.  See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Motion for 
Summ. J., supra note 374, at 20–22. 
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There were troubling implications of the district court’s justiciability 
opinion in Oversight Committee v. Holder.  After establishing 
jurisdiction, the district court nevertheless categorized essential 
separation of powers questions on the merits of the dispute as 
potentially nonjusticiable questions.405  Specifically, the court suggested 
that questions of congressional “need for the material,” the “merits of 
the grounds for withholding” by the Executive, and the adequacy of the 
Attorney General’s offers of accommodation would “put the Court 
squarely in the position of second guessing political decisions and take it 
well outside of its comfortable role of resolving legal questions that are 
amenable to judicial determination.”406 
If a court is going to resolve an important dispute between Congress 
and the President, congressional need, withholding grounds, and 
accommodation alternatives are the essential inquiry.  Otherwise, the 
exercise could be almost clerical in that the court could simply offer a 
binary ruling: deliberative process privilege is available or not.  Then, 
the court would basically assess whether the committee had jurisdiction 
over the matter, whether the subpoena was duly executed, and whether 
the documents in dispute were responsive.  Swept away would be any 
particularized analysis of the executive branch confidentiality interests 
in a categorical exercise.  Such a ruling would adopt the congressional 
litigation model nearly wholesale, to the detriment of the constitutional 
structure.  The court had adopted the Oversight Committee’s frame of 
the question presented: “[C]an the executive properly assert executive 
privilege to shield an agency’s deliberative processes when the records 
in dispute do not reveal advice provided to the President himself or 
address his core constitutional functions?”407 
A categorical ruling about the availability of deliberative process 
privilege would provide no check against unscrupulous or unskillfully 
drafted discovery requests.  In the context of a congressional subpoena 
challenged by an individual as overbroad on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, the Supreme Court has observed: “[A]dequacy or excess in the 
breadth of the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, 
 
405.  Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24–25 (D.D.C. 
2013). 
406.  Id. at 25. 
407.  Id. at 17 n.7. 
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purposes and scope of the inquiry.”408  Moreover, as expressed in 
Cheney, the Supreme Court views tailored discovery as an essential 
safeguard for separation of powers.409  For the Holder court to issue a 
binary ruling as to the deliberative process privilege, rather than 
engaging in particularized analysis of the scope of the inquiry, would be 
incongruent with the Supreme Court precedent related to tailored 
discovery. 
It would also render irrelevant a demonstration of congressional 
need in relation to the documents sought.  The need and grounds 
dichotomy is especially integral to the dispute in Holder.  The district 
court acknowledges that the documents at this point do not address the 
problematic ATF tactics involved in Fast and Furious:  “The facts have 
been uncovered; the risks inherent in the operation—risks that were 
tragically realized in the death of a federal law enforcement officer—
have been exposed; and the Department has issued clear directives 
prohibiting similar conduct in the future.”410  The notion that the 
underlying facts about controversial ATF investigative tactics have 
come to light and been remedied should bear on the analysis of 
Congress’s need to further intrude on executive branch deliberations. 
This observation raises another sensitivity in the Holder opinion.  
What is largely at issue now is Congress’s desire to conduct an 
“obstruction” investigation related to a February 4, 2011, letter411 to 
Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA) that contained inaccurate information 
in response to his inquiry about initial Operation Fast and Furious 
allegations.412  The Department later indicated it lacked confidence in 
the letter, which it ultimately withdrew.413  In fact, Congress received a 
 
408.  McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382 (1960) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Okla. Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
409.  Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 386–87 (2004). 
410.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3. 
411.  Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Charles Grassley, Ranking 
Minority Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 4, 2011). 
412.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3–4.  Congress calls this letter a “lie” in its brief.  See 
Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 300, at 3.  This assertion is contested by the 
Executive Branch and Democrats, who cite an evidentiary record indicating that the author 
of the letter provided the inaccurate information based on representations made by other 
components in the field.  See, e.g., Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, supra note 75, at 
9–10. 
413.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 3. 
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fulsome factual airing on how it was drafted.414  Such disclosure was a 
significant accommodation by the Executive to allow a window into its 
deliberative processes vis-à-vis Congress, but one that was warranted 
under the circumstances of the inaccurate representation. 
As noted above, however, the congressional subpoena calls for 
vastly broader and more intrusive information.  It seeks to peer into 
deliberations within the Executive about how to deal with Congress 
itself, which has no bearing on the investigation of the Operation in 
question.  What is troubling, however, is how dismissive the district 
court was of the special nature of the deliberations involved, at least in 
the context of rejecting the Attorney General’s framing of the question 
presented by the litigation.415 
A categorical ruling denying the applicability of deliberative process 
privilege to congressional subpoenas would then leave viable only 
presidential communications privilege.  That would unduly confine 
legitimate confidentiality interests to those in personal proximity to the 
President rather than recognizing the multiplicity of functions, informed 
by deliberations of varying importance, across the Executive Branch.  It 
would favor form over function and vindicate the congressional 
litigation model to the exclusion of competing values. 
While the courts have a role to play as final arbiter, the currency of 
congressional–executive relations should be accommodation and 
compromise.  Therefore, the task for the judiciary in Holder is to try to 
preserve that delicate balance in our constitutional scheme.  It is a 
balance that provides Congress with a robust investigative power, 
encourages executive branch responsibility, preserves executive 
functions, incentivizes informal conflict resolution, and minimizes 
judicial involvement.  The court should ensure that its ruling promotes 
these constitutional values. 
First, as the beneficiary of the status quo ante, the Executive must 
believe it could be forced by a court to comply with a subpoena.  While 
there are routine incentives to resolve oversight conflicts, as well as 
congressional self-help remedies, there are cases from time to time that 
seem incapable of resolution.  Such cases, if left without any resolution, 
 
414.  See Jonathan Strong, Justice Department Reveals Origins of False Gun Letter to 
Grassley, ROLL CALL (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.rollcall.com/news/justice_department_reveal
s_origins_of_false_gun_letter_to_grassley-210742-1.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8YCJ-
NREM. 
415.  Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 16–17 n.7. 
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could unduly tip the overall scheme in favor of unscrupulous executive 
activity.  Therefore, there needs to be a threat of judicial involvement, 
albeit remote, encouraging the White House to compromise. 
Second, there must be uncertainty about the outcome in a given 
case.  If the courts merely decide, wholesale, whether certain privileges 
are available to the Executive vis-à-vis Congress, then the courts will 
have done significant violence to the structural separation of powers.  If 
the courts adopt the congressional reading of Espy that would render 
deliberative process privilege, no matter the specific factual application, 
to be a mere common law—and hence inapplicable—privilege, it would 
undermine important executive branch functions.  State secrets doctrine 
and presidential communications privilege do not cover the range of 
legitimate executive branch concerns.  Congress’s discovery excesses, 
like those in Holder, would also be left unchecked.  Alternatively, if the 
courts hold the deliberative process privilege available to the Executive 
without regard to Congress’s legitimate oversight interests, it would 
serve to eliminate the threat of judicial involvement, and again, the 
Executive would lack proper incentive to comply with congressional 
information requests. 
Third, when called into the fray, the courts need to adopt the role of 
mediator in the first instance, which will hopefully promote settlement 
by means of facilitated accommodation.  Failing that, the courts need to 
get into the muck and mire of document-by-document in camera review.  
Such a process should be governed by legal standards that give due 
regard to the multiplicity of context-specific outcomes.  Each 
investigative dispute will involve a unique equation of congressional 
needs and executive confidentiality grounds. 
Neither branch will be wholly comfortable with this approach to 
resolving congressional–executive oversight disputes.  While generally 
adopting the competing interests concept of the executive branch 
transactional model, this approach rejects the Executive’s 
nonjusticiability arguments.  On the other hand, Congress will not be 
pleased with the idea of a searching court review of investigative needs 
and discovery tradecraft.  Congress, and its advocates, will also likely be 
concerned about any expansion (in its view) of executive privilege 
doctrine.  Neither branch will enjoy searching inquiry by the judiciary.  
However, this approach allows for judicial resolution of irreconcilable 
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interbranch oversight disputes of sufficient import that they lead to 
contempt citation and executive privilege assertion. 
The court’s first ruling in the merits phase of Holder, however, 
signaled its sensitivity to these concerns.416  The court ordered the 
Department of Justice to produce an executive privilege log analogous 
to an attorney–client privilege log in regular civil litigation.  The court’s 
Solomonic reasoning surely caused consternation at both ends of 
Pennsylvania Avenue.   
Relying on Espy, the court observed that “precedent binding on this 
Court establishes the existence of a deliberative process privilege as a 
form of executive privilege, but it also sets forth the prerequisites that 
must be established before that privilege can be recognized.”417  
Recognizing the value of interbranch-accommodated dispute resolution, 
the court had referred the parties to a judicial mediator, to no avail by 
the time of the privilege log ruling opinion.  The opinion continues on 
that path by narrowing, and delaying, the dispute by means of the 
privilege log on a path toward judicially facilitated accommodation. 
Production of a privilege log to Congress presents a political 
problem for the Executive that is not present in normal litigation.  
Disclosure of the participants to conversations but not the substance is 
the traditional format of attorney–client privilege logs, but one can 
readily imagine the coming congressional characterization of entries in 
the privilege log reflecting innocuous but potentially privileged 
communications between Department and White House officials.  Such 
disclosures, and the politicized characterization of them, will add 
pressure to the Executive to reach a compromise. 
On the other hand, Congress lost its most prized legal—litigation 
model—argument.  Congress had advanced a long-held institutional 
view that the deliberative process privilege was categorically unavailable 
to the Executive as a defense against a congressional subpoena.418  As 
noted above, Congress argued that deliberative process privilege is 
derived from the common law and, unlike presidential communications 
privilege, does not enjoy constitutional status.419  Thus, deliberative 
 
416.  Order, supra note 402, at 1. 
417.  Id. 
418.  The House brief included a section titled, “Deliberative Process Privilege . . . Does 
Not Apply to Congressional Subpoenas.”  Mem. of P.&A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 
supra note 362, at 25–33. 
419.  Id. at 27. 
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process privilege is akin to attorney–client privilege, which Congress 
may choose to honor or disregard on a case-by-case basis.420  The 
Executive advanced an equally deeply held view to the contrary, that 
the deliberative process privilege is one constitutionally grounded 
component of an umbrella doctrine of executive privilege.421  The court 
rejected Congress’s “suggestion that the only privilege the executive can 
invoke in response to a subpoena is the Presidential communications 
privilege.”422 
Judicial resolution of categorical questions such as the availability, or 
not, of deliberative process privilege could alter the separation of 
powers.  Congress and the Executive have tended to state their positions 
in categorical terms.  In this case, the Executive lost its chief categorical 
argument against the justiciability of the dispute, and Congress lost on 
its article of faith that deliberative process privilege held mere common 
law status. 
Once the privilege log is produced, and barring a settlement by the 
branches, it will be interesting to see how the court weighs congressional 
need for information against executive confidentiality interests.  Both of 
those calculations, while essential to the dispute, are inherently political.  
Questions of justiciability and privilege availability decided, the Holder 
court will continue to contend with litigation and transactional models at 
the document-level privilege analysis. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrates that Congress and the Executive have 
fundamentally divergent views of the nature of constitutional structure.  
Congress’s investigative model of oversight seeks to establish its 
superior position in a hierarchy and its entitlement to nearly all 
executive branch materials.  In contrast, the Executive focuses on its 
branch equality and views these interactions as transactional rather than 
procedural.  More than a constitutional theory, these divergent views 
explain branch behavior, in practice, at every stage of oversight 
interaction:  document requests, phone calls, briefings, letter exchanges, 
subpoenas, contempt votes, executive privilege assertions, and contempt 
litigation briefs. 
 
420.  Id. at 30. 
421.  See Mem. in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. and in Opp’n to Pl.’s Motion for 
Summ. J., supra note 374, at 20–21. 
422.  Order, supra note 402, at 2. 
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Holder focuses on whether deliberative process privilege is a valid 
basis for President Obama’s assertion of executive privilege over the 
remaining documents sought by Congress in connection with Fast and 
Furious.  However, it raises far more profound issues about the nature 
of interbranch relations because it invites the courts to choose one of the 
two models.  The courts should decline the invitation, and thus far the 
district court appears to be proceeding with a negotiated, or perhaps 
imposed, settlement in mind.  Both branches claim too much, but their 
models also serve constitutional values.  Importantly, the congressional 
litigation model contemplates judicial imposition where executive 
recalcitrance borders on lawlessness.  And the transactional model’s 
central premise—that Congress and the Executive have competing 
legitimate interests—is a better reflection of a healthy constitutional 
scheme than one in which the Executive is a regulated entity and 
Congress is the regulator.  Both branches claim interests that are 
compelling and raise valid concerns about the other branch’s 
perspective. 
There should be a strong presumption against judicial resolution of 
congressional oversight disputes in categorical terms.  The Executive is 
correct that routine judicial involvement in such disputes gives rise to 
real danger along the lines of the Heisenberg Principle.  While all three 
branches have a role in interpreting their own roles in the constitutional 
scheme, the judiciary is the first among equals.  As such, it has 
jurisdiction to decide interbranch oversight dispute cases in order to 
preserve order.  Article III tribunals need to use the scalpel rather than 
meat axe when presented with bickering political branches.    
As litigation proceeds to the merits in Holder, the court appears to 
appreciate that congressional need and confidentiality grounds are the 
essential elements of inquiry in any effort to resolve this dispute.  
Further, the court should evaluate these needs and grounds against the 
backdrop of other political remedies available to Congress.  It should 
give due focus on mediation principles that facilitate accommodation 
and compromise rather than establishing categorical congressional 
entitlements or presidential prerogatives.  It needs to be solicitous of 
executive branch concerns while facilitating congressional needs in a 
particularized fashion.  To do otherwise could do violence to structural 
separation of powers. 
